[TLS] ticket_lifetime and generic network layer

2017-02-09 Thread Mark Dunn
I am reading your TLS 3.1 Standard and the mailing list. It looks great. I am particularly interested in using the 0-RTT feature for IoT timestamped data, which would seem immune from replay attacks I have a couple of questions 1) The maximum ticket lifetime is set to 7 days. Is this bas

[TLS] tls - New Meeting Session Request for IETF 98

2017-02-09 Thread "IETF Meeting Session Request Tool"
A new meeting session request has just been submitted by Sean Turner, a Chair of the tls working group. - Working Group Name: Transport Layer Security Area Name: Security Area Session Requester: Sean Turner Number of Sessions: 1 Length o

Re: [TLS] ticket_lifetime and generic network layer

2017-02-09 Thread Ilari Liusvaara
On Thu, Feb 09, 2017 at 12:38:50PM -, Mark Dunn wrote: > I am reading your TLS 3.1 Standard and the mailing list. > > It looks great. > > I am particularly interested in using the 0-RTT feature for IoT timestamped > data, which would seem immune from replay attacks > > > > I have a coupl

[TLS] PR#875: Additional Derive-Secret Stage

2017-02-09 Thread Eric Rescorla
I've just posted a pull request which slightly adjusts the structure of key derivation. PR#875 adds another Derive-Secret stage to the left side of the key ladder between each pair of HKDF-Extracts. There are two reasons for this: - Address a potential issue raised by Trevor Perrin where an attack

[TLS] (no subject)

2017-02-09 Thread Eric Rescorla
Hi folks, We need to close on an issue about the size of the state in the HelloRetryRequest. Because we continue the transcript after HRR, if you want a stateless HRR the server needs to incorporate the hash state into the cookie. However, this has two issues: 1. The "API" for conventional hashes

Re: [TLS] PR#875: Additional Derive-Secret Stage

2017-02-09 Thread Martin Thomson
This is a good idea. On 10 February 2017 at 08:15, Eric Rescorla wrote: > - Address a potential issue raised by Trevor Perrin where an attacker > somehow forces the IKM value to match the label value for Derive-Secret, > in which case the output of HKDF-Extract would match the derived secret.

[TLS] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)

2017-02-09 Thread Sean Turner
All, We’ve got two outstanding PRs that propose changes to draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Section 5.5 “Limits on Key Usage”. As it relates to rekeying, these limits have been discussed a couple of times and we need to resolve once and for all whether the TLS WG wants to: a) Close these two PRs and go w

Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)

2017-02-09 Thread Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev
Dear Sean, dear all, I find the existing limits quite reasonable and would prefer that we'll stay conservative here, so I'd prefer option a) go with the existing text. Best regards, Stanislav Smyshlyaev 2017-02-10 8:07 GMT+03:00 Sean Turner : > All, > > We’ve got two outstanding PRs that prop

Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)

2017-02-09 Thread Martin Thomson
On 10 February 2017 at 16:07, Sean Turner wrote: > a) Close these two PRs and go with the existing text [0] > b) Adopt PR#765 [1] > c) Adopt PR#769 [2] a) I'm happy enough with the current text (I've implemented that any it's relatively easy). I could live with c, but I'm opposed to b. It just