Re: [TLS] TLS weakness in Forward Secrecy compared to QUIC Crypto

2016-04-11 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
> On Apr 11, 2016, at 9:05 AM, Martin Rex wrote: > > The TTL of a DNS record is *NOT* protected by DNSSEC, and can be > regenerated at will by an attacker, will be regenerated by intermediate > DNS server and its purpose is purely cache-management, *NOT* security. > > Only the "Signature Expira

Re: [TLS] TLS weakness in Forward Secrecy compared to QUIC Crypto

2016-04-11 Thread Salz, Rich
> > Can you compare the TTL of the ephemeral key record with the A/ > > record TTL? Are they related? If someone can get phony records into > > DNS, can they then become the real MLT server? For how long? > > > Admittedly I don't know anything about MLT, but your question indicates > what

Re: [TLS] TLS weakness in Forward Secrecy compared to QUIC Crypto

2016-04-11 Thread Martin Rex
Salz, Rich wrote: >> In MinimaLT, the current ephemeral key for the server is added to >> the DNS record fetched during the DNS lookup. These entries expire fairly >> quickly, ensuring that old keys are never used. > > Can you compare the TTL of the ephemeral key record with the > A/ rec

Re: [TLS] TLS weakness in Forward Secrecy compared to QUIC Crypto

2016-04-11 Thread Salz, Rich
> In MinimaLT, the current ephemeral key for the server is added to > the DNS record fetched during the DNS lookup. These entries expire fairly > quickly, ensuring that old keys are never used. Can you compare the TTL of the ephemeral key record with the A/ record TTL? Are they relate

Re: [TLS] TLS weakness in Forward Secrecy compared to QUIC Crypto

2016-04-08 Thread Eric Rescorla
On Fri, Apr 8, 2016 at 6:42 PM, Wan-Teh Chang wrote: > On Fri, Apr 8, 2016 at 2:31 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > > > ... TLS 1.3 supports two PSK-resumption modes: > > > > 1. Pure PSK, which has somewhat better security properties than in TLS > 1.2 > > 2. PSK-ECDHE, which has similar security pro

Re: [TLS] TLS weakness in Forward Secrecy compared to QUIC Crypto

2016-04-08 Thread Colm MacCárthaigh
On Fri, Apr 8, 2016 at 1:50 PM, Jim Roskind wrote: > If a symmetric-session-ticket-decryption-key was compromised by a server, > as a result of a break-in, or a subpoena, then all traffic that depended on > the session resumption tickets would be at risk. Moreover, a third party > attacker that

Re: [TLS] TLS weakness in Forward Secrecy compared to QUIC Crypto

2016-04-08 Thread Eric Rescorla
On Fri, Apr 8, 2016 at 6:13 PM, Bill Cox wrote: > On Fri, Apr 8, 2016 at 1:50 PM, Jim Roskind wrote: > >> The combination of DHE and TLS 1.3 session resumption via session >> tickets, can destroy the forward secrecy property that DHE was intended to >> provide. With the proposed removal of DHE-