Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-18 Thread Martin Thomson
I commented on the pull requests, but to close the loop here: I can live with the acceptance signal proposed in #423. However, I might still prefer the approach I proposed. I say "might" because I might not understand the objections that have been raised properly. I *think* that the main conc

Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-15 Thread Christopher Patton
HI Martin, all, I added another alternative, so let me summarize for everyone the possible paths forward, with links to the corresponding PRs. 1. https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/407: HRRInner and HRROuter (original proposal, deemed too complicated). 2. https://github.com/tlswg/dr

Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-05 Thread Martin Thomson
I've created a few pull requests that make the changes I propose. I think that the whole suite of related issues are closed as a result. The main one is here: https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/417 There's a bit of rewriting here, but the change is not that large. I would expect

Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-01 Thread Martin Thomson
I'm going to briefly respond, but as this is a public holiday and I have no real desire to work too much, please forgive any radio silence that follows. On Fri, Apr 2, 2021, at 05:56, David Benjamin wrote: > This was a previous attempt at this, but it seems to have been confusing. > > I do agree

Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-01 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hiya, On 01/04/2021 19:24, Stephen Farrell wrote: some guidance on checking your front- end's choice of curves and failing when some of the HRR cases get out of whack Actually it occurs to me that we could for example say that back-ends are RECOMMENDED to support the first curve listed in ECH

Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-01 Thread David Benjamin
Hi Martin, Thanks for the comments. As the author of #374, I obviously didn't think it so clearly unnecessary, but glad to hear your thoughts. Hopefully we can get on the same page as to what the issues are and/or a better solution. (Always happy to replace something with a simpler option, provide

Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-01 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hiya, On 01/04/2021 19:28, Carrick Bartle wrote: I absolutely agree both that we seem to be almost happily adding complexity I don't think you have to assume bad intent (or negligence). Several people brought up valid concerns and we're trying to address them. Hmm. I got an offlist mail on

Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-01 Thread Carrick Bartle
> I absolutely agree both that we seem to be almost > happily adding complexity I don't think you have to assume bad intent (or negligence). Several people brought up valid concerns and we're trying to address them. > On Apr 1, 2021, at 4:46 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > > I'm not sure I ag

Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-01 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hiya, On 01/04/2021 19:13, Christopher Patton wrote: But let me ask a question meanwhile - how often does HRR actually happen and could we not just let ECH fail in a bunch of situations that would otherwise require all this new complexity? One way HRR is used is in case the client's and serv

Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-01 Thread Christopher Patton
One way HRR is used is in case the client's and server's cipher suite > preferences don't intersect. This feature is an essential part of TLS, as > there's no a priori reason why the client and server will initially > advertise overlapping preferences. (They usually do, hence the claim that > HRR i

Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-01 Thread Christopher Patton
> But let me ask a question meanwhile - how often does HRR > actually happen and could we not just let ECH fail in a > bunch of situations that would otherwise require all this > new complexity? > One way HRR is used is in case the client's and server's cipher suite preferences don't intersect. Th

Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-01 Thread Stephen Farrell
Given the range of Martin's comments, I'd be surprised if that could be reduced to a PR;-) But let me ask a question meanwhile - how often does HRR actually happen and could we not just let ECH fail in a bunch of situations that would otherwise require all this new complexity? Thanks, S. On 0

Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-01 Thread Christopher Patton
Hi Martin, would you mind working out a PR? I think being able to compare 407 to a concrete alternative would be helpful. Just so that we're on the same page, here's a quick summary of the issues that 407 is designed to solve. (These may or may not be problems in your view, and I don't claim this l

Re: [TLS] Don't Split HelloRetryRequest

2021-04-01 Thread Stephen Farrell
I'm not sure I agree with all of Martin's remarks below, but I absolutely agree both that we seem to be almost happily adding complexity and that that's a bad plan. S. On 01/04/2021 02:57, Martin Thomson wrote: I just reviewed the proposal to split HelloRetryRequest into outer and (encrypted)