Re: [TLS] [Errata Rejected] RFC6176 (5520)

2018-10-16 Thread Eugène Adell
@Florian The document is about the SSL 2.0 security deficiencies, particularly the ones that brought its prohibition. The solutions to these deficiencies might also have their own problems, as it's often the case in security related topics which look like a never-ending debate (a problem, a soluti

Re: [TLS] [Errata Rejected] RFC6176 (5520)

2018-10-15 Thread Florian Weimer
* RFC Errata System: > Corrected Text > -- >o The root certificate authority keys are overexposed. The server > sends only one certificate signed by a root certificate authority, > which means a frequent use of this authority keys for signing new > certificates.

Re: [TLS] [Errata Rejected] RFC6176 (5520)

2018-10-11 Thread Ryan Sleevi
You will likely find https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/2018OctDec/0013.html useful in explaining the process and purpose of errata, and what it means, in practice, to update the document. This understanding will hopefully make it clear why the errata was rejected. On Thu, Oct 11, 2

Re: [TLS] [Errata Rejected] RFC6176 (5520)

2018-10-11 Thread Eugène Adell
Yes, I know the deficiencies list as reported in this document is not exhaustive but it's worth mentionning this one even in a rejected errata. It had a greater impact than the MITM reset, the latter being mentionned. Le jeu. 11 oct. 2018 à 15:27, RFC Errata System a écrit : > The following erra