Re: [TLS] secdir review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03

2017-05-23 Thread Daniel Migault
Thank you for the clarifying text. I have added it on my local copy. Yours, Daniel On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 1:35 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > Sorry for the slow reply. > > On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 12:58:07PM -0400, Daniel Migault wrote: > > Thank you, > > > > Your comments have all been addressed.

Re: [TLS] secdir review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03

2017-05-22 Thread Benjamin Kaduk
Sorry for the slow reply. On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 12:58:07PM -0400, Daniel Migault wrote: > Thank you, > > Your comments have all been addressed. I have one remaining clarification. > In my text the SHOULD NOT was intended to the ECDHE_PSK in general, and not > only for the cipher suites of the d

Re: [TLS] secdir review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03

2017-05-19 Thread Daniel Migault
Thank you, Your comments have all been addressed. I have one remaining clarification. In my text the SHOULD NOT was intended to the ECDHE_PSK in general, and not only for the cipher suites of the draft. In your opinion do we clarify this, and should we use something else than SHOULD NOT ? Thanks

Re: [TLS] secdir review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03

2017-05-19 Thread Benjamin Kaduk
On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 11:55:35AM -0400, Daniel Migault wrote: > Hi Benjamin, > > Thank you for the review. Please find my comments inline and let me know if > you agree with the proposed text. I believe the only point not addressed > concerns the addition of CCM-256 which has been remove after d

Re: [TLS] secdir review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03

2017-05-19 Thread Daniel Migault
Hi Martin, Thank you for the proposed text. It was very clear and I took it entirely, just changing s/TLSv1/TLS 1/. Yours, Daniel The current text is as follows: The cipher suites defined in this document MUST NOT be negotiated for any version of (D)TLS other than TLS 1.2. TLS version 1.3

Re: [TLS] secdir review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03

2017-05-19 Thread Daniel Migault
Hi Benjamin and Dave, Thanks for the clarification. Considering also Roman' s and Ben' s comments the section is built as follow. 1) Limit cipher suites to TLS1.2, 2) explain how TLS1.3 and higher version negotiate them 3) bring all explanation foe the previous versions. Yours, Daniel The text i

Re: [TLS] secdir review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03

2017-05-19 Thread Daniel Migault
Hi Benjamin, Thank you for the review. Please find my comments inline and let me know if you agree with the proposed text. I believe the only point not addressed concerns the addition of CCM-256 which has been remove after discussion during the WGLC. Thanks you for the review, Yours, Daniel On

Re: [TLS] secdir review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03

2017-05-19 Thread Benjamin Kaduk
On 05/19/2017 02:16 AM, Dave Garrett wrote: > On Friday, May 19, 2017 12:38:27 am Benjamin Kaduk wrote: >> In section 4, "these cipher suites MUST NOT be negotiated in TLS >> versions prior to 1.2" should probably clarify that "these" cipher >> suites are the new ones specified by this document. >

Re: [TLS] secdir review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03

2017-05-19 Thread Martin Rex
Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > > Some other editorial nits follow. > > In section 4, "these cipher suites MUST NOT be negotiated in TLS > versions prior to 1.2" should probably clarify that "these" cipher > suites are the new ones specified by this document. This reminds me of the specification goofs

Re: [TLS] secdir review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03

2017-05-19 Thread Dave Garrett
On Friday, May 19, 2017 12:38:27 am Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > In section 4, "these cipher suites MUST NOT be negotiated in TLS > versions prior to 1.2" should probably clarify that "these" cipher > suites are the new ones specified by this document. Probably should be: "the cipher suites defined in

[TLS] secdir review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03

2017-05-18 Thread Benjamin Kaduk
Hi all, I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments ju