Re: [TLS] comment on draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address

2019-03-27 Thread Hubert Kario
On Wednesday, 27 March 2019 14:51:43 CET Martin Thomson wrote: > On Tue, Mar 26, 2019, at 14:30, Hubert Kario wrote: > > On Tuesday, 26 March 2019 09:07:51 CET Martin Thomson wrote: > > > We don't trust that the key share or certificate is good either, but > > > once we have a Finished message, tha

Re: [TLS] comment on draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address

2019-03-27 Thread Martin Thomson
On Tue, Mar 26, 2019, at 14:30, Hubert Kario wrote: > On Tuesday, 26 March 2019 09:07:51 CET Martin Thomson wrote: > > We don't trust that the key share or certificate is good either, but once we > > have a Finished message, that is retroactively authenticated and can be > > used. We rely on this

Re: [TLS] comment on draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address

2019-03-26 Thread Hubert Kario
On Tuesday, 26 March 2019 09:07:51 CET Martin Thomson wrote: > We don't trust that the key share or certificate is good either, but once we > have a Finished message, that is retroactively authenticated and can be > used. We rely on this property for a bunch of things. yes, but those things are p

Re: [TLS] comment on draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address

2019-03-26 Thread Martin Thomson
We don't trust that the key share or certificate is good either, but once we have a Finished message, that is retroactively authenticated and can be used. We rely on this property for a bunch of things. On Mon, Mar 25, 2019, at 19:12, Hubert Kario wrote: > On Monday, 25 March 2019 17:02:34 CET

Re: [TLS] comment on draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address

2019-03-25 Thread Hubert Kario
On Monday, 25 March 2019 17:02:34 CET David Schinazi wrote: > Ah, I see - thanks. In other words, the proposal requires trusting the > server and the reply comes before the identity of the server has been > authenticated. exactly > David > > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 4:54 PM Hubert Kario wrote: >

Re: [TLS] comment on draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address

2019-03-25 Thread David Schinazi
Ah, I see - thanks. In other words, the proposal requires trusting the server and the reply comes before the identity of the server has been authenticated. David On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 4:54 PM Hubert Kario wrote: > On Monday, 25 March 2019 15:09:21 CET David Schinazi wrote: > > Hi Hubert, > >

Re: [TLS] comment on draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address

2019-03-25 Thread Hubert Kario
On Monday, 25 March 2019 15:09:21 CET David Schinazi wrote: > Hi Hubert, > > Can you elaborate on how "TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to > the IP address information"? In my understanding, TLS only provides > integrity and authenticity to a byte stream, not to how your byte stream i

Re: [TLS] comment on draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address

2019-03-25 Thread David Schinazi
Hi Hubert, Can you elaborate on how "TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to the IP address information"? In my understanding, TLS only provides integrity and authenticity to a byte stream, not to how your byte stream is being transported over the network. Thanks, David On Mon, Mar 25,

[TLS] comment on draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address

2019-03-25 Thread Hubert Kario
I wanted to rise one comment on the IETF session, but we ran out of time: given that TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to the IP address information, shouldn't the protocol require the client to perform the full handshake and only then request information from the server? I.e. make i