That's only because there is some chance that the ticket binds in more
contextual information. In practice, this might also happen as a
result of application-layer changes. At the TLS layer, it's hard to
know exactly why the new ticket was issued. If it was just adding
another ticket to the pile
On Friday, 16 March 2018 17:19:49 CET Matt Caswell wrote:
> What is reasonable behaviour for a client to do with any tickets it has
> previously received following a key update or a post-handshake
> authentication? Should those old tickets be now considered out-of-date
> and not used?
as far as I
On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 4:19 PM, Matt Caswell wrote:
> What is reasonable behaviour for a client to do with any tickets it has
> previously received following a key update or a post-handshake
> authentication? Should those old tickets be now considered out-of-date
> and not used?
>
There is no g
What is reasonable behaviour for a client to do with any tickets it has
previously received following a key update or a post-handshake
authentication? Should those old tickets be now considered out-of-date
and not used?
Matt
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