[TLS] Re: [TLS]Working Group Last Call for "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3"

2024-09-01 Thread Martin Thomson
Much belated approval. One minor issue and some nits. Section 4 talks about failure, but doesn't really put enough work in. If this is an error that needs to be retried, then a new error code is necessary. Decapsulation failure will occur at the server, which will have to indicate that failu

[TLS] Re: [TLS]Working Group Last Call for "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3"

2024-09-01 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hiya, On 9/1/24 22:04, Douglas Stebila wrote: On Sep 1, 2024, at 10:47 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: Section 3.2 says there are two allowed ways to handle the same component algs being used in multiple key shares. However, doesn't ECH mean that additional possibilities exist? What should a cli

[TLS] Re: [TLS]Working Group Last Call for "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3"

2024-09-01 Thread Eric Rescorla
It's not specified one way or the other in ECH but HPKE S 4.1 strongly suggests you should not be reusing these values: Namely: def Encap(pkR): skE, pkE = GenerateKeyPair() And skE means you are generating a key of type E: Ephemeral (E): Role of a fresh random value meant for one-time

[TLS] Re: [TLS]Working Group Last Call for "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3"

2024-09-01 Thread Douglas Stebila
> On Sep 1, 2024, at 10:47 AM, Stephen Farrell > wrote: > > Section 3.2 says there are two allowed ways to handle the same > component algs being used in multiple key shares. However, > doesn't ECH mean that additional possibilities exist? What > should a client do in terms of re-use when using

[TLS] Re: [TLS]Working Group Last Call for "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3"

2024-09-01 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hiya, On 8/12/24 20:50, Deirdre Connolly wrote: This email starts the working group last call for the Internet-Draft "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3", located here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design/ The WG last call will end 26th August 2024 @ 2359 UTC. Apologie