Re: [TLS] ESNI: Tracking and blocking via record_digest

2019-11-25 Thread Rob Sayre
Yes, and this concern is covered well by the draft in GitHub, imho. thanks, Rob On Mon, Nov 25, 2019 at 7:33 PM Christian Huitema wrote: > Actually there is one use case in which the anonymity set is size 1 -- > mobile servers. The name of the mobile server cannot be deduced from its > temporar

Re: [TLS] ESNI: Tracking and blocking via record_digest

2019-11-25 Thread Christian Huitema
Actually there is one use case in which the anonymity set is size 1 -- mobile servers. The name of the mobile server cannot be deduced from its temporary address. It can also not be deduced from the ESNI. But it can be deduced from the record digest. The mobile server who wants to maintain privacy

Re: [TLS] ESNI: Tracking and blocking via record_digest

2019-11-25 Thread Rob Sayre
You're right, this is all there in the draft. It's just scattered around a bit, and "anonymity set" is used only once and not defined. I filed an issue https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/204 in case the editors want to consolidate text on this concern. thanks, Rob On Mon, Nov 2

[TLS] ESNI: Tracking and blocking via record_digest

2019-11-25 Thread Rob Sayre
Hi, I see the issue of tracking and blocking via record_digest has come up a few times in the github repository, but I don't understand the resolution. If someone wanted to observe or block traffic to "example.com", couldn't they retrieve the ESNI keys, calculate the record_digest themselves, and