On 23 September 2016 at 04:04, Colm MacCárthaigh wrote:
> If the problem is the use of forward secrecy then there is a simple
solution, don't use it.
That is, you can, as a server, have a fixed key_share for which the
secret exponent becomes the private key exactly as in the RSA ca
Hi all,
On 22 September 2015 at 15:23, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
u...@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
> Also, if compression is moved from TLS to upper layer(s) - how would it
> mitigate compression-related attacks? Besides "now it's somebody else's
> problem"?
>
It allows the authors of the layers ab
Hi Manuel,
On 19 July 2015 at 12:21, Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard wrote:
> I'm probably wrong since I only thought about it for a few minutes, but it
> seems to me that the PasswordVerify message would be encrypted with (keys
> derived from) the handshake master secret, which would prevent offline
>
