[TLS] Why has Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3 expired?

2024-04-04 Thread Wang Guilin
Dear all, It seems that I have missed some updated info about the following TLS WG document. Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3 draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-09 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design/ I thought that it was the main approach for TLS PQ migration. However, it ha

Re: [TLS] Adoption call for TLS Flag - Request mTLS

2024-04-04 Thread Eric Rescorla
On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 7:38 PM Mike Bishop wrote: > Ekr, can I ask you to clarify this a little? I fully agree that extensions > to TLS which support a particular application-layer protocol should be done > in that protocol’s working group unless and until it’s demonstrated that > many unrelated

Re: [TLS] Adoption call for TLS Flag - Request mTLS

2024-04-04 Thread Mike Bishop
Ekr, can I ask you to clarify this a little? I fully agree that extensions to TLS which support a particular application-layer protocol should be done in that protocol’s working group unless and until it’s demonstrated that many unrelated applications will need something similar. (At which point

[TLS] Last Call: (The SSLKEYLOGFILE Format for TLS) to Informational RFC

2024-04-04 Thread The IESG
The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls) to consider the following document: - 'The SSLKEYLOGFILE Format for TLS' as Informational RFC The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive

Re: [TLS] Adoption call for TLS Flag - Request mTLS

2024-04-04 Thread Dennis Jackson
Ah, I wonder what the motivation was for it being a MUST rather than a SHOULD. That still leaves open sending a private use value - which would allow you to de-conflict with others uses. On 04/04/2024 17:11, Jonathan Hoyland wrote: Hi Dennis, RFC 7250 Section 4.1 says: If the client has no

Re: [TLS] Adoption call for TLS Flag - Request mTLS

2024-04-04 Thread Jonathan Hoyland
Hi Dennis, RFC 7250 Section 4.1 says: If the client has no remaining certificate types to send in the client hello, other than the default X.509 type, it MUST omit the client_certificate_type extension in the client hello. That seems to explicitly exclude sending the single entry 0 to me.

Re: [TLS] Adoption call for TLS Flag - Request mTLS

2024-04-04 Thread Dennis Jackson
Hi Jonathan, My reading of RFC 7250 is the same as Mohits. Although the RFC talks about raw public keys and a new codepoint for them, it is building on RFC 6091 which defined a similar extension and the X509 codepoint. It seems fine for you to send the client_certificate_type extension with

Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-00.txt

2024-04-04 Thread Salz, Rich
> Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-00.txt is now available. It is a work item of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) WG of the IETF. This was just a post-adoption publication to avoid expiry. No changes yet. ___ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org h

Re: [TLS] I-D on TLS authentication with VC

2024-04-04 Thread hannes . tschofenig=40gmx . net
Hi Andrea, Thanks for sharing the info. Could you say a bit more about your IoT use case? Ciao Hannes -Original Message- From: TLS On Behalf Of Andrea Vesco Sent: Donnerstag, 4. April 2024 10:53 To: tls@ietf.org Subject: [TLS] I-D on TLS authentication with VC L. Perugini and I have w

Re: [TLS] Adoption call for TLS Flag - Request mTLS

2024-04-04 Thread Jonathan Hoyland
Hi all, Thanks for the feedback here. With respect to RFC 7250, as I mentioned earlier on list, there seen to be two issues. First it changes the semantics of the extension slightly, and second the RFC explicitly excludes x.509 certs. IIUC the semantics of the extension are "I have a weird clien

[TLS] I-D on TLS authentication with VC

2024-04-04 Thread Andrea Vesco
L. Perugini and I have written an I-D on the use of Verifiable Credentials [1][2] as an additional authentication mode in TLS. We presented the I-D to the ALLDISPATCH WG during IETF119 and the outcome was to explore the potential interest of the TLS WG. The I-D proposes to add (i) a new Certifi