I wish I understood the analysis of TLS 1.3 better, but a core feature
of the protocol is compositionality: the keys from the handshake are
fresh, unlike in TLS 1.2 where they were used to encrypt the Finished
thus posing an obstacle to analysis. Here the handshake key gets used
to encrypt a messag
Thanks, Barry. I will incorporate your fixes in the next version, due soon.
-- Christian Huitema
On 9/4/2019 8:41 PM, Barry Leiba via Datatracker wrote:
> Barry Leiba has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-05: No Objection
>
> When responding, please keep th
Barry Leiba has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-05: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
introductory paragraph, however.)
Please refer to
On Wed, Sep 4, 2019 at 3:39 AM Björn Haase wrote:
> Dear Rob,
>
> you might know that currently there is an ongoing PAKE selection process
> in the context of the CFRG working group. SRP is no longer considered there.
>
Well, that list is way over my head. Thank you for pointing it out, though.
Dear Rob,
you might know that currently there is an ongoing PAKE selection process in the
context of the CFRG working group. SRP is no longer considered there.
In my opinion, SRP comes with several problems. It’s patent circumvention
approach did consider patents that today are expired. This pa
Thank David.
I originally encountered the zero bytes in the signature field (the
screenshot I posted in my mail) with a client device during client cert
auth.
Android Version: 6.0.1
Hardware: samsung SM-T580 (Galaxy Tab A6)
It was sending proper client Certificate, but it was sending client
Cert
