On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 03:24:02PM +, Lanlan Pan wrote:
> Benjamin Kaduk 于2018年3月14日周三 上午10:02写道:
>
> > It seems like we get ourselves in trouble by allowing multiple
> > external PSKs to be present. If we allowed at most one external
> > PSK in a given ClientHello, then aborting the handshak
On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:09 PM, Darin Pettis wrote:
> Agreed. I know a lot of good work has gone into TLS 1.3 and having
> visibility to the data once it hits the data center seems like a new
> capability to the good folks working that have had TLS 1.3 in mind for the
> last couple years. B
Agreed. I know a lot of good work has gone into TLS 1.3 and having
visibility to the data once it hits the data center seems like a new
capability to the good folks working that have had TLS 1.3 in mind for the
last couple years. But to enterprises, they have visibility to their data
today and
> On Mar 18, 2018, at 11:27 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
> After discussion with the chairs and the AD, I have opted to just add a
> section
> that explains the attack. I just merged that (but managed not to get it into
> -27
> due to fumble fingering).
It seems to me that privacy consideratio
After discussion with the chairs and the AD, I have opted to just add a
section
that explains the attack. I just merged that (but managed not to get it
into -27
due to fumble fingering).
-Ekr
On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 8:27 AM, Hubert Kario wrote:
> When the server supports externally set PSKs th
Benjamin Kaduk 于2018年3月14日周三 上午10:02写道:
> It seems like we get ourselves in trouble by allowing multiple
> external PSKs to be present. If we allowed at most one external
> PSK in a given ClientHello, then aborting the handshake on binder
> failure would be the correct choice, as discovering a va
As you can see, -27 is out.
Sorry that I forgot to add a ChangeLog to this document. There should be no
technical changes, but a lot of editorial ones.
There is, I believe, one normative change, which is given here:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26&url2=draft-ietf-tls-tls
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.
Title : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version
1.3
Author : Eric Rescorla
Filename
Hi Kathleen,
Sorry for the delay. We'll have an updated draft addressing the IESG
discuss/comments shortly after the I-D submission window opens early
this week.
The one other sticking point is the issue that Viktor has raised about
extending
the protocol to provide pinning to prevent downgrade t