I think there are two very different scenarios where an identity needs to be
associated with an external PSK, that is a PSK that is not produced by a
previous handshake. This draft only addresses one of them, and I would rather
see a way forward that considers both.
This draft considers the sc
On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 5:05 AM, Andreas Walz
wrote:
> I fully support not to add new options / complexity to TLS "just because
> they are
> there" and I'm not at all doubting the rationale behind this.
>
> Our use case is legacy industrial communication over extremely lean media
> (low
> bandwidt
I fully support not to add new options / complexity to TLS "just because
they are
there" and I'm not at all doubting the rationale behind this.
Our use case is legacy industrial communication over extremely lean
media (low
bandwidth, high error rate, etc.). We are investigating all directions
of c
On Tue, 17 Jan 2017 13:03:35 +0100
"Andreas Walz" wrote:
> I know there is some comprehensible reluctance against bloating the
> TLS ecosystem with even more cipher suites, but still ... have there
> been considerations / discussions on adding ChaCha20+Poly1305 cipher
> suites with truncted authe
Hi all,
I know there is some comprehensible reluctance against bloating the TLS
ecosystem
with even more cipher suites, but still ... have there been considerations /
discussions
on adding ChaCha20+Poly1305 cipher suites with truncted authentication tags for
(D)TLS?
Thanks and Cheers,
Andi Wal
