Personally, I would like to see God's Word copied freely with no
barriers to copying, but I do like the idea of authentication with
digital signatures to detect tampering. We can do that with some texts,
but will not get legal permission to distribute some of them without
some annoyances. So, ironi
Manfred Bergmann wrote:
>>> What about signing the module with a private key.
>>> Every frontend has to have the public key included [..]
>>> This would enable an integrity check.
> It [..] would detect changes to texts and also only CrossWire could
> sign modules.
I like Debian's mechanism of pu
I have received very similar enquiries when discussing things with Bible
Societies and Translation Agencies.
This is really several distinct topics rolled up into one, but which should
really be distinguished from one another.
- Provenance = ensuring that the text used by CrossWire to make a SWO
On Wed, Mar 11, 2009 at 11:29 PM, DM Smith wrote:
>
> On Mar 11, 2009, at 5:04 AM, Peter von Kaehne wrote:
>
>> One of the problems which has come up again and again when discussing
>> with publishers has been the worry that texts which are released to
>> CrossWire become an easy target for abuse
Am 11.03.2009 um 12:29 schrieb DM Smith:
On Mar 11, 2009, at 5:04 AM, Peter von Kaehne wrote:
One of the problems which has come up again and again when discussing
with publishers has been the worry that texts which are released to
CrossWire become an easy target for abuse - either commercia
On Mar 11, 2009, at 5:04 AM, Peter von Kaehne wrote:
One of the problems which has come up again and again when discussing
with publishers has been the worry that texts which are released to
CrossWire become an easy target for abuse - either commercial abuse
with
texts of some commercial imp
On 11/03/2009, Peter von Kaehne wrote:
>
> One of the problems which has come up again and again when discussing
> with publishers has been the worry that texts which are released to
> CrossWire become an easy target for abuse - either commercial abuse with
> texts of some commercial importance or
Am 11.03.2009 um 10:33 schrieb Mark Trompell:
On Wed, Mar 11, 2009 at 10:44 AM, Manfred Bergmann wrote:
Just a thought.
What about signing the module with a private key.
Every frontend has to have the public key included somewhere hidden.
This would enable an integrity check.
'somewhere hid
On Wed, Mar 11, 2009 at 10:44 AM, Manfred Bergmann wrote:
> Just a thought.
>
> What about signing the module with a private key.
> Every frontend has to have the public key included somewhere hidden.
> This would enable an integrity check.
'somewhere hidden' doesn't work too well with opensource
Just a thought.
What about signing the module with a private key.
Every frontend has to have the public key included somewhere hidden.
This would enable an integrity check.
Manfred
Am 11.03.2009 um 09:04 schrieb Peter von Kaehne:
One of the problems which has come up again and again when di
I have thought about this one myself. Surely there is a way that modules
can be flagged as modules not able to be exported using mod2osis or
mod2imp. That is the real issue, if I understand correctly. It should be
a no-brainer that encrypted modules should not be able to be exported.
That requi
One of the problems which has come up again and again when discussing
with publishers has been the worry that texts which are released to
CrossWire become an easy target for abuse - either commercial abuse with
texts of some commercial importance or, more worrying to me at least -
manipulation of t
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