On Fri, Jun 16, 2023 at 11:28 AM Mike Kravetz wrote:
>
> On 06/06/23 19:03, Ackerley Tng wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > This patchset builds upon a soon-to-be-published WIP patchset that Sean
> > published at https://github.com/sean-jc/linux/tree/x86/kvm_gmem_solo,
> > mentioned
> > at [1].
> >
> > Th
On Tue, Jan 10, 2023 at 1:19 AM Chao Peng wrote:
> >
> > Regarding the userspace side of things, please include Vishal's selftests
> > in v11,
> > it's impossible to properly review the uAPI changes without seeing the
> > userspace
> > side of things. I'm in the process of reviewing Vishal's v2
On Thu, Dec 1, 2022 at 10:20 PM Chao Peng wrote:
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM
> +static bool restrictedmem_range_is_valid(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> +pgoff_t start, pgoff_t end,
> +gfn_t *gfn_start,
On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 8:18 AM Chao Peng wrote:
>
> From: "Kirill A. Shutemov"
>
> Introduce 'memfd_restricted' system call with the ability to create
> memory areas that are restricted from userspace access through ordinary
> MMU operations (e.g. read/write/mmap). The memory content is expected
On Mon, Nov 28, 2022 at 4:37 PM Michael Roth wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 11:13:37PM +0800, Chao Peng wrote:
> > From: "Kirill A. Shutemov"
> >
> > Introduce 'memfd_restricted' system call with the ability to create
> > memory areas that are restricted from userspace access through ordinary
On Mon, Oct 24, 2022 at 8:30 PM Kirill A . Shutemov
wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 21, 2022 at 04:18:14PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 21, 2022, Chao Peng wrote:
> > > >
> > > > In the context of userspace inaccessible memfd, what would be a
> > > > suggested way to enforce NUMA memor
On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 8:48 PM Chao Peng wrote:
>
> This patch series implements KVM guest private memory for confidential
> computing scenarios like Intel TDX[1]. If a TDX host accesses
> TDX-protected guest memory, machine check can happen which can further
> crash the running host system, this
On Wed, Oct 19, 2022 at 9:02 PM Kirill A . Shutemov
wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 07:12:10PM +0530, Vishal Annapurve wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 3:27 AM Kirill A . Shutemov
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon, Oct 17, 2022 at 06:39:06PM +0200, Gupta, P
On Thu, Sep 15, 2022 at 8:04 PM Chao Peng wrote:
>
> From: "Kirill A. Shutemov"
>
> KVM can use memfd-provided memory for guest memory. For normal userspace
> accessible memory, KVM userspace (e.g. QEMU) mmaps the memfd into its
> virtual address space and then tells KVM to use the virtual addres
On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 3:27 AM Kirill A . Shutemov
wrote:
>
> On Mon, Oct 17, 2022 at 06:39:06PM +0200, Gupta, Pankaj wrote:
> > On 10/17/2022 6:19 PM, Kirill A . Shutemov wrote:
> > > On Mon, Oct 17, 2022 at 03:00:21PM +0200, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> > > > On 9/15/22 16:29, Chao Peng wrote:
> >
> ...
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> index 230c8ff9659c..bb714c2a4b06 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> @@ -914,6 +914,35 @@ static int kvm_init_mmu_notifier(struct kvm *kvm)
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER && KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER
> > Hmm, so a new slot->arch.page_attr array shouldn't be necessary, KVM can
> > instead
> > update slot->arch.lpage_info on shared<->private conversions. Detecting
> > whether
> > a given range is partially mapped could get nasty if KVM defers tracking to
> > the
> > backing store, but if KVM
...
> > > /*
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > index afe18d70ece7..e18460e0d743 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > @@ -2899,6 +2899,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
> > > if (max_level
...
> With this patch series, it's actually even not possible for userspace VMM
> to allocate private page by a direct write, it's basically unmapped from
> there. If it really wants to, it should so something special, by intention,
> that's basically the conversion, which we should allow.
>
A VM
>
> Private memory map/unmap and conversion
> ---
> Userspace's map/unmap operations are done by fallocate() ioctl on the
> backing store fd.
> - map: default fallocate() with mode=0.
> - unmap: fallocate() with FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE.
> The map/unmap will trig
On Thu, May 19, 2022 at 8:41 AM Chao Peng wrote:
>
> Introduce a new memfd_create() flag indicating the content of the
> created memfd is inaccessible from userspace through ordinary MMU
> access (e.g., read/write/mmap). However, the file content can be
> accessed via a different mechanism (e.g. K
On Thu, Mar 10, 2022 at 6:09 AM Chao Peng wrote:
>
> From: "Kirill A. Shutemov"
>
> Introduce a new memfd_create() flag indicating the content of the
> created memfd is inaccessible from userspace through ordinary MMU
> access (e.g., read/write/mmap). However, the file content can be
> accessed v
On Thu, Mar 10, 2022 at 6:11 AM Chao Peng wrote:
>
> KVM gets notified when memory pages changed in the memory backing store.
> When userspace allocates the memory with fallocate() or frees memory
> with fallocate(FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE), memory backing store calls into
> KVM fallocate/invalidate ca
On Thu, Mar 10, 2022 at 6:10 AM Chao Peng wrote:
>
> From: "Kirill A. Shutemov"
>
> It maintains a memfile_notifier list in shmem_inode_info structure and
> implements memfile_pfn_ops callbacks defined by memfile_notifier. It
> then exposes them to memfile_notifier via
> shmem_get_memfile_notifie
On Mon, Mar 28, 2022 at 10:17 AM Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 10, 2022 at 6:09 AM Chao Peng wrote:
> >
> > This is the v5 of this series which tries to implement the fd-based KVM
> > guest private memory. The patches are based on latest kvm/queue branch
> > commit:
> >
> > d5089416b7f
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