Re: bits of encryption

2016-11-12 Thread Bill Cole
On 11 Nov 2016, at 14:31, li...@lazygranch.com wrote: On Fri, 11 Nov 2016 09:54:48 -0500 "Bill Cole" wrote: [big snip...] The bottom line (if you've made it this far...) is that the settings that involve deep encryption parameters in modern Postfix are best left at their default values unle

Re: bits of encryption

2016-11-12 Thread li...@lazygranch.com
On Sat, 12 Nov 2016 15:29:54 -0500 "Bill Cole" wrote: > On 11 Nov 2016, at 14:31, li...@lazygranch.com wrote: > > > On Fri, 11 Nov 2016 09:54:48 -0500 > > "Bill Cole" wrote: > > [big snip...] > > >> The bottom line (if you've made it this far...) is that the > >> settings that involve deep

Re: bits of encryption

2016-11-12 Thread Bill Cole
On 12 Nov 2016, at 18:59, li...@lazygranch.com wrote: # postconf tls_high_cipherlist tls_high_cipherlist = aNULL:-aNULL:HIGH:@STRENGTH verified Assuming the default "high" setting is sufficient, why wouldn't I change this parameter to high rather than medium. postconf smtpd_tls_mandatory_cip

Re: bits of encryption

2016-11-12 Thread li...@lazygranch.com
On Sun, 13 Nov 2016 01:43:17 -0500 "Bill Cole" wrote: > If the NSA/GCHQ capturing all of your SMTP traffic and saving it for > hypothetical future decryption is a realistic and significant > scenario in your threat model, you should reconsider your use of > email. > I'm in the USA and getting

Re: bits of encryption

2016-11-12 Thread Juri Haberland
On 13.11.2016 07:55, li...@lazygranch.com wrote: > On Sun, 13 Nov 2016 01:43:17 -0500 > "Bill Cole" wrote: > > >> If the NSA/GCHQ capturing all of your SMTP traffic and saving it for >> hypothetical future decryption is a realistic and significant >> scenario in your threat model, you should rec