Re: smtpd_end_of_data_restrictions check_policy_service called even after REJECT in header_checks

On Mon, Nov 09, 2015 at 03:09:39PM +1100, Robert Mueller wrote: > > Alternatively, I guess you could add something like a > > smtpd_end_of_session_restrictions that runs after the cleanup commit is > > complete? At that point is already either queued or rejected by cleanup. So such a "callback"

Re: header_checks with other table types

On 11/08/2015 07:18 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > No need, just use "postmap -q". Good idea, I didn't think of that. > You can also ask postmap to > read multi-line message headers from a message file. > > See the postmap(1) manpage for details of the "-h", "-m" (and "-b") > options. Thanks, I d

Re: smtpd_end_of_data_restrictions check_policy_service called even after REJECT in header_checks

> I see that there are smtp_header_checks that must run during the smtp > sending phase, would it be worth adding smtpd_header_checks (with some > restrictions likes the smtp_* ones) that run in smtpd during the message > reading phase? Having a look at the code, this appears annoying. It appears

Re: OpenDKIM

On 11/7/2015 10:03 AM, yahoogro...@lazygranch.xyz wrote: > ‎Note that Domain Keys is not the same as DKIM. DKIM supercedes Domain Keys. > > http://support2.constantcontact.com/articles/FAQ/2213 > > I'm no guru on this, so correct away if I'm wrong. > > I can pass DKIM, but not Domain Keys. I d

Re: Weak Ciphers

On Sun, Nov 08, 2015 at 07:52:27AM -0500, John Allen wrote: > I ran the ssl-tools tests on my mail server. > Everything seems to be OK, *BUT* it reports that i am using a weak cipher > "ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"! Ignore their report for now. I am tentatively planning to disable RC4 in default

Re: Weak Ciphers

‎http://disablessl3.com/ When I ran a series of email server checks, I was surprised that one claimed to disable ssl3 to avoid the poodle hack. Seems very unlikely to me. ‎ Anyway, the link above does suggest doing that.   Original Message   From: Alice Wonder Sent: Sunday, November 8, 2015 1:2

Re: Weak Ciphers

To be RFC compliant port 25 must accept MTA to MTA connections with no encryption. When another server can't connect with encryption, it will try without. Allowing weak ciphers is better than the result where ciphers are not used because the other server only supports older ciphers in my opini

Re: Weak Ciphers

Hi John, On 2015-11-08 13:52, John Allen wrote: I ran the ssl-tools tests on my mail server. Everything seems to be OK, BUT it reports that i am using a weak cipher "ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"! So I sat down and googled - postfix/dovecot/apache - ciphers suites/recommendations less than one y

Re: Weak Ciphers

Am 08.11.2015 um 13:52 schrieb John Allen: I ran the ssl-tools tests on my mail server. Everything seems to be OK, *BUT* it reports that i am using a weak cipher "ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"! So I sat down and googled - postfix/dovecot/apache - ciphers suites/recommendations less than one year

Re: postscreen and smtpd chroot

> I can't help but notice that > > http://www.postfix.org/POSTSCREEN_README.html#config > > suggests to disable the chroot on all new services, and notably > smtpd. Also, all socket paths (e.g. milter) have to be updated. > > Is this necessary? postscreen seems to work fine with all these > se

Weak Ciphers

I ran the ssl-tools tests on my mail server. Everything seems to be OK, *BUT* it reports that i am using a weak cipher "ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"! So I sat down and googled - postfix/dovecot/apache - ciphers suites/recommendations less than one year old. I gave up at about the fifteenth res

postscreen and smtpd chroot

Hey folks, thanks to a hint on IRC, I started experimenting with postscreen(8) to fend off some hefty zombie attacks. I can't help but notice that http://www.postfix.org/POSTSCREEN_README.html#config suggests to disable the chroot on all new services, and notably smtpd. Also, all socket paths