FW: [HACKERS] Increasing security in a shared environment ...

2004-03-31 Thread Simon Riggs
>Marc G. Fournier wrote > Does anyone know how ppl like Oracle handle this? Are system catalogs > like this open to all users? The system catalogs for Oracle and most other systems I know of are secure. In both Oracle and Teradata the "system tables" are actually views, which are actively gran

Re: [HACKERS] Increasing security in a shared environment ...

2004-03-29 Thread Marc G. Fournier
On Mon, 29 Mar 2004, Andrew Dunstan wrote: > It's that "probably" that niggles a bit. I don't know what usage > patterns other people have, and since my typical use is exactly *one* > user other than the owner/dba, and all access is mediated by my > middleware, none of this affects me. ISTM we nee

Re: [HACKERS] Increasing security in a shared environment ...

2004-03-29 Thread scott.marlowe
On Mon, 29 Mar 2004, Marc G. Fournier wrote: > On Mon, 29 Mar 2004, Dave Page wrote: > > > It's rumoured that Euler Taveira de Oliveira once said: > > > Hi Christopher, > > > > > >> > "The \l command should only list databases that the current user is > > >> > authorized for, the \du command shou

Re: [HACKERS] Increasing security in a shared environment ...

2004-03-29 Thread Andrew Dunstan
Tom Lane wrote: Andrew Dunstan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: I just played around briefly with removing *all* public access to a couple of catalog tables - pg_class and pg_attrdef. Obviously this breaks things like \d and friends. I'm not sure how much else it might break - pg_dump, for

Re: [HACKERS] Increasing security in a shared environment ...

2004-03-29 Thread Dave Page
It's rumoured that Marc G. Fournier once said: > On Mon, 29 Mar 2004, Dave Page wrote: > > k, but what I'm suggesting shouldn't prevent that, should it? They > should only be able to see those resources that they have permissions > to see, not all of them ... no? Wouldn't that require per-row per

Re: [HACKERS] Increasing security in a shared environment ...

2004-03-29 Thread Marc G. Fournier
On Mon, 29 Mar 2004, Dave Page wrote: > It's rumoured that Euler Taveira de Oliveira once said: > > Hi Christopher, > > > >> > "The \l command should only list databases that the current user is > >> > authorized for, the \du command should only list users authorized > >> > for the current databas

Re: [HACKERS] Increasing security in a shared environment ...

2004-03-29 Thread Tom Lane
Andrew Dunstan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > I just played around briefly with removing *all* public access to a > couple of catalog tables - pg_class and pg_attrdef. Obviously this > breaks things like \d and friends. I'm not sure how much else it might > break - pg_dump, for starters ... I'

Re: [HACKERS] Increasing security in a shared environment ...

2004-03-29 Thread Dave Page
It's rumoured that Euler Taveira de Oliveira once said: > Hi Christopher, > >> > "The \l command should only list databases that the current user is >> > authorized for, the \du command should only list users authorized >> > for the current database (and perhaps only superusers should get >> > even

Re: [HACKERS] Increasing security in a shared environment ...

2004-03-29 Thread Marc G. Fournier
On Mon, 29 Mar 2004, Andrew Dunstan wrote: > My previous answer to this question has been "use a middleware layer > that exposes just the operations you want exposed". But this issue has > come up a few times so maybe some more thought is needed. Of course, we > are only talking about metadata her

Re: [HACKERS] Increasing security in a shared environment ...

2004-03-29 Thread Euler Taveira de Oliveira
Hi Christopher, > > "The \l command should only list databases that the current user is > > authorized for, the \du command should only list users authorized for the > > current database (and perhaps only superusers should get even that much > > information), etc. Perhaps it is possible to set PG

Re: [HACKERS] Increasing security in a shared environment ...

2004-03-29 Thread Andrew Dunstan
Christopher Kings-Lynne wrote: "The \l command should only list databases that the current user is authorized for, the \du command should only list users authorized for the current database (and perhaps only superusers should get even that much information), etc. Perhaps it is possible to set PG

Re: [HACKERS] Increasing security in a shared environment ...

2004-03-28 Thread Christopher Kings-Lynne
"The \l command should only list databases that the current user is authorized for, the \du command should only list users authorized for the current database (and perhaps only superusers should get even that much information), etc. Perhaps it is possible to set PG to do this, but that should prob

[HACKERS] Increasing security in a shared environment ...

2004-03-28 Thread Marc G. Fournier
How hard would it be to add this: "The \l command should only list databases that the current user is authorized for, the \du command should only list users authorized for the current database (and perhaps only superusers should get even that much information), etc. Perhaps it is possible to set