Re: [HACKERS] Proposed GUC Variable

2002-08-27 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tom Lane) wrote > "Ross J. Reedstrom" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >> I agree that a 'trimmed' query is likely to be useless, but the idea of >> printing the query on ERROR is a big win for me: > > Certainly. I think though that an on-or-off GUC option is sufficient. > We don'

Re: [HACKERS] @(#)Mordred Labs advisory 0x0007: Remove DoS in PostgreSQL

2002-08-26 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bruce Momjian) wrote > Sir-* does have a point. A valid host in pg_hba.conf can cause DOS by > just connecting over and over, but allocating almost all of the memory > on the machine would affect other applications running on the machine, > even non-networked applications, as

Re: [HACKERS] [SECURITY] DoS attack on backend possible

2002-08-21 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Florian Weimer) wrote > [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > >> if you are going to be passing any user input to the database, you >> must/should validate in some manner before blindly passing it to the db. >> The db can and should guarantee data integrity, but the database cannot >

Re: [HACKERS] @(#) Mordred Labs advisory 0x0001: Buffer overflow in

2002-08-20 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Greg Copeland) wrote > Time and time again I've read what basically amounts to, "...if someone > can crash it it's because someone is stupid enough to allow someone to > be able to do it in the first place..." Maybe you're right. After all, > if core developers continue to tu

Re: [HACKERS] [SECURITY] DoS attack on backend possible

2002-08-20 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Curt Sampson) wrote in > On Mon, 19 Aug 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > >> $input = "user'name"; >> INSERT INTO db (name) VALUES ('$input'); >> >> will fail because the ' in the input needs to be escaped with a >> backslash. > > It will fail because you're doing this a very, v

Re: [HACKERS] [SECURITY] DoS attack on backend possible

2002-08-19 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Florian Weimer) wrote > Alvar Freude <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > >>> What about checking the input for backslash, quote, >>> and double quote (\'")? If you are not taking care of those in >>> input then crashing the backend is going to be the least of your >>> worries. >

Re: [HACKERS] Open 7.3 items

2002-08-18 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tom Lane) wrote > * If a connection request has a username with a trailing '@' (and no > embedded '@'), then the '@' is stripped and connection proceeds. > > * Otherwise, '@dbname' is appended to the given username and > connection proceeds. > It might be worth recalling the

Re: [HACKERS] Open 7.3 items

2002-08-16 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bruce Momjian) wrote > > I know the trailing @ is ugly, but it prevents surpises when connecting > to the database. > if you would make the magic character a variable then perhaps you could prevent the ugly... if/when you turn off the feature, you could set the PGSQL_STUPI

Re: [HACKERS] Open 7.3 items

2002-08-15 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Vince Vielhaber) wrote > Here we go again. I thought you just said that the @ wouldn't be > something a user would have to do. I understood that to be any user. > It's back to ugly again. > > Vince. If it means anything to you, I agree that it should be a configure/compile

Re: [HACKERS] Open 7.3 items

2002-08-14 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bruce Momjian) wrote: > Tom Lane wrote: >> Bruce Momjian <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >> > I don't know where else to go with the patch at this point. I >> > think increasing the number of 'global' users is polluting the >> > namespace too much, >> >> Why? If the installation

Re: [HACKERS] Open 7.3 items

2002-08-14 Thread ngpg
> OK, the vote is not shifting from '.' to '@'. Is that how we want to > go? I like the pg_user enhancement. Marc, comments? This was your > baby. > Would it be hard to setup an internal PG variable for the actual character to be used? ---(end of broadcast)--

Re: [HACKERS] OOP real life example (was Re: Why is MySQL more

2002-08-14 Thread ngpg
> Summary: > > 1. The current implementation is broken. > > 2. We have no proper description of how a "fixed" implementation > should work. > > 3. It's hard to fix the current implementation without such a > description. > > 4. Thus, we are in other messages here tryin

Re: [HACKERS] [SECURITY] DoS attack on backend possible (was: Re:

2002-08-12 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Florian Weimer) wrote in [EMAIL PROTECTED]:">news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]: > Gavin Sherry <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > >>> Yes, but if you just check that the date given by the user matches the >>> regular expression "[0-9]+-[0-9]+-[0-9]+", it's still possible to >>> crash the bac