Re: [HACKERS] Multi-entry indexes (with a view to XPath queries)

2001-06-25 Thread Tom Lane
"John Gray" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Firstly, I appreciate this may be a hare-brained scheme, but I've been > thinking about indexes in which the tuple pointer is not unique. It sounds pretty hare-brained to me all right ;-). What's wrong with the normal approach of one index tuple per heap

Re: [HACKERS] [PATCH] Re: Setuid functions

2001-06-25 Thread Mark Volpe
I updated the patch to use the SET AUTHORIZATION { INVOKER | DEFINER } terminology. Also, the function owner is now determined and saved at compile time (no gotchas here, right?). It is located at http://volpe.home.mindspring.com/pgsql/set_auth.patch Mark ---(end of broa

AW: AW: AW: [HACKERS] [PATCH] Re: Setuid functions

2001-06-25 Thread Zeugswetter Andreas SB
> > I am not sure whether the feature does not actually present a security > > hole ? Two collaborating users can pass each other their privileges. > > I don't see any (new) security risk here. Code written by one user can > be executed with the privileges of another --- so what? That's the >

Re: AW: AW: AW: [HACKERS] [PATCH] Re: Setuid functions

2001-06-25 Thread Tom Lane
Zeugswetter Andreas SB <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Without making the "definer" need an additional grant for creating such > a function, it would be like giving him all the privs he has > "with grant option". Hmm ... interesting analogy, but does it hold water? The GRANT OPTION stuff implie

Re: AW: AW: [HACKERS] [PATCH] Re: Setuid functions

2001-06-25 Thread Tom Lane
Zeugswetter Andreas SB <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > I am not sure whether the feature does not actually present a security > hole ? Two collaborating users can pass each other their privileges. I don't see any (new) security risk here. Code written by one user can be executed with the privile

AW: AW: [HACKERS] [PATCH] Re: Setuid functions

2001-06-25 Thread Zeugswetter Andreas SB
> > Anybody else want to object to this abbreviation idea ? > > I thought we already agreed to change the names per Peter's suggestion. > > I didn't like the original names whether abbreviated or not ... Good. I have not seen that agreement, maybe it was implied. I am not sure whether the feat

Re: AW: [HACKERS] [PATCH] Re: Setuid functions

2001-06-25 Thread Tom Lane
Zeugswetter Andreas SB <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Anybody else want to object to this abbreviation idea ? I thought we already agreed to change the names per Peter's suggestion. I didn't like the original names whether abbreviated or not ... regards, tom lane --

Re: AW: [HACKERS] [PATCH] Re: Setuid functions

2001-06-25 Thread Mark Volpe
Actually, I liked the SET AUTHORIZATION { DEFINER | INVOKER } terminology mentioned earlier. Mark Zeugswetter Andreas SB wrote: > > > > This patch will implement the "ENABLE PRIVILEGE" and "DISABLE PRIVILEGE" > > > commands in PL/pgSQL, which, respectively, change the effective uid to that >

AW: [HACKERS] Good name for new lock type for VACUUM?

2001-06-25 Thread Zeugswetter Andreas SB
> > Still, it's an interesting alternative. Comments anyone? > > SelfExclusiveLock is clear and can't be confused with other > lock types. How about giving it a label ? SelfExclusive would somehow suggest, that you can have more than one self exclusive lock. Like: lock table atab in s

AW: [HACKERS] [PATCH] Re: Setuid functions

2001-06-25 Thread Zeugswetter Andreas SB
> > This patch will implement the "ENABLE PRIVILEGE" and "DISABLE PRIVILEGE" > > commands in PL/pgSQL, which, respectively, change the effective uid to that > > of the function owner and back. It doesn't break security (I hope). The > > commands can be abbreviated as "ENABLE" and "DISABLE" for