Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2020-04-06 Thread David Steele
On 4/5/20 6:15 AM, Peter Eisentraut wrote: On 2020-03-27 15:58, David Steele wrote: Hi Peter, On 12/27/19 3:22 PM, Stephen Frost wrote: * Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote: I think it'd be great if this behavior could be implemented within the notation, because we could then just set up a

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2020-04-05 Thread Peter Eisentraut
On 2020-03-27 15:58, David Steele wrote: Hi Peter, On 12/27/19 3:22 PM, Stephen Frost wrote: * Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote: I think it'd be great if this behavior could be implemented within the notation, because we could then just set up a non-empty default pg_ident.conf with useful

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2020-03-27 Thread David Steele
Hi Peter, On 12/27/19 3:22 PM, Stephen Frost wrote: * Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote: I think it'd be great if this behavior could be implemented within the notation, because we could then just set up a non-empty default pg_ident.conf with useful behavioral examples in the form of prefab

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-27 Thread Stephen Frost
Greetings, * Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote: > Stephen Frost writes: > > * Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote: > >> Still, I take your point that "peer" does risk letting in a set of > >> connections wider than what the DBA was thinking about. Enlarging > >> on my other response that what

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-27 Thread Stephen Frost
Greetings, * Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote: > Stephen Frost writes: > > * Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote: > >> But ... if "peer" auth allowed all the cases Peter wants to allow, > >> we'd not be having this discussion in the first place, would we? > > > I'm still not entirely convince

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-27 Thread Tom Lane
Stephen Frost writes: > * Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote: >> Still, I take your point that "peer" does risk letting in a set of >> connections wider than what the DBA was thinking about. Enlarging >> on my other response that what we want is an auth option not a whole >> new auth type, maybe

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-27 Thread Tom Lane
Stephen Frost writes: > * Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote: >> But ... if "peer" auth allowed all the cases Peter wants to allow, >> we'd not be having this discussion in the first place, would we? > I'm still not entirely convinced it doesn't, but that's also because I > keep thinking we're t

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-27 Thread Stephen Frost
Greetings, * Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote: > Peter Eisentraut writes: > > Well, if this is the pg_hba.conf setup and I am considering the > > authentication method when creating new users, then my only safe option > > is to not create any new users. Because which OS users exist is not

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-27 Thread Stephen Frost
Greetings, * Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote: > Stephen Frost writes: > > Why not have a special user that can be used for Type: local pg_hba.conf > > lines? So you'd have: > > local all localowner peer > > That way you're: > > a) only keeping the types we have today > > b) using peer auth,

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-27 Thread Tom Lane
Peter Eisentraut writes: > Well, if this is the pg_hba.conf setup and I am considering the > authentication method when creating new users, then my only safe option > is to not create any new users. Because which OS users exist is not > controlled by the DBA. If the OS admin and the DBA are t

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-27 Thread Tom Lane
Stephen Frost writes: > Why not have a special user that can be used for Type: local pg_hba.conf > lines? So you'd have: > local all localowner peer > That way you're: > a) only keeping the types we have today > b) using peer auth, which is what this actually is > c) NOT using 'trust', which we s

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-27 Thread Stephen Frost
Greetings, * Peter Eisentraut (peter.eisentr...@2ndquadrant.com) wrote: > On 2019-12-18 16:24, Stephen Frost wrote: > >Which represents pretty much exactly what you're going for here, doesn't > >it..? > > This is similar but not exactly the same thing: (1) It doesn't work if the > OS user name an

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-27 Thread Stephen Frost
Greetings, * Peter Eisentraut (peter.eisentr...@2ndquadrant.com) wrote: > On 2019-12-18 15:09, Robert Haas wrote: > >I feel like this is taking a policy decision that properly belongs in > >pg_hba.conf and making it into a GUC. If you're introducing a GUC > >because it's not possible to configure

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-27 Thread Peter Eisentraut
On 2019-12-18 16:24, Stephen Frost wrote: As for the question about how to set up pg_hba.conf so that just the DB owner can log in via peer, the Debian/Ubuntu packages are deployed, by default, with an explicit message and entry: # DO NOT DISABLE! # If you change this first entry you will need t

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-27 Thread Peter Eisentraut
On 2019-12-18 15:09, Robert Haas wrote: I feel like this is taking a policy decision that properly belongs in pg_hba.conf and making it into a GUC. If you're introducing a GUC because it's not possible to configure the behavior that you want in pg_hba.conf, then I think the solution to that is to

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-18 Thread Stephen Frost
Greetings, * Peter Eisentraut (peter.eisentr...@2ndquadrant.com) wrote: > On 2019-12-17 05:40, Stephen Frost wrote: > >* Peter Eisentraut (peter.eisentr...@2ndquadrant.com) wrote: > >>The idea is that if you connect over a Unix-domain socket and the local > >>(effective) user is the same as the se

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-18 Thread Robert Haas
On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 5:27 AM Peter Eisentraut wrote: > I realize that there are a number of facilities nowadays to do enhanced > security setups. But let's consider what 99% of users are using. If > the database server runs as user X and you are logged in as user X, you > should be able to ma

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-17 Thread Peter Eisentraut
On 2019-12-17 05:40, Stephen Frost wrote: * Peter Eisentraut (peter.eisentr...@2ndquadrant.com) wrote: The idea is that if you connect over a Unix-domain socket and the local (effective) user is the same as the server's (effective) user, then access should be granted immediately without any chec

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-16 Thread Andrew Dunstan
> > This has been hanging around for a while. I guess the reason it hasn't > > got much attention is that on its own it's not terribly useful. > > However, when you consider that it's a sensible prelude to setting a > > more secure default for auth in initdb (I'd strongly advocate > > SCRAM-SHA-256

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-16 Thread Stephen Frost
Greetings, * Peter Eisentraut (peter.eisentr...@2ndquadrant.com) wrote: > The idea is that if you connect over a Unix-domain socket and the local > (effective) user is the same as the server's (effective) user, then > access should be granted immediately without any checking of > pg_hba.conf. Bec

Re: Allow cluster owner to bypass authentication

2019-12-16 Thread Andrew Dunstan
On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 9:07 PM Peter Eisentraut wrote: > > This is an implementation of the idea I mentioned in [0]. > > The naming and description perhaps isn't ideal yet but it works in > principle. > > The idea is that if you connect over a Unix-domain socket and the local > (effective) user i