Re: Key management with tests

2021-01-31 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear All. Thank you for all opinions and discussions regarding the KMS/TDE function. First of all, to get to the point of this email, I want to participate in anything I can do (review or development) when TDE related development is in progress. If there is a meeting related to it, I can't commun

Re: Exposure related to GUC value of ssl_passphrase_command

2020-03-08 Thread Moon, Insung
at 11:43 AM Fujii Masao wrote: > > > > On 2020/02/14 10:31, Moon, Insung wrote: > > Dear Hackers. > > > > Thank you for an response. > > I registered this entry in commifest of 2020-03. > > # I registered in the security part, but if it is wrong, sincerely

Re: Internal key management system

2020-03-05 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Sawada-san I don't know if my environment or email system is weird, but the V5 patch file is only include simply a changed list. and previous V4 patch file size was 64kb, but the v5 patch file size was 2kb. Can you check it? Best regards. Moon. On Tue, Mar 3, 2020 at 5:58 PM Masahiko Sawada

Re: Flexible pglz_stategy values and delete const.

2020-02-17 Thread Moon, Insung
Hello. On Tue, Feb 18, 2020 at 1:20 PM Michael Paquier wrote: > > On Mon, Feb 17, 2020 at 11:04:47AM +0900, Moon, Insung wrote: > > The compression-related strategy is applied only when compressed. > > Decompression does not use strategy, so the old compressed data is not >

Flexible pglz_stategy values and delete const.

2020-02-16 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Hackers. For the current PostgreSQL, the toast data and some WAL data (page data) are compressed using the LZ-based algorithm. For PostgreSQL, two types of strategy(PGLZ_strategy_default, PGLZ_strategy_always) are provided by default, and only used of PGLZ_strategy_default(default values) on

Re: Exposure related to GUC value of ssl_passphrase_command

2020-02-13 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Hackers. Thank you for an response. I registered this entry in commifest of 2020-03. # I registered in the security part, but if it is wrong, sincerely apologize for this. And I'd like to review show authority to ssl_ * later and discuss it in a separate thread. Best regards. Moon. On Thu,

Re: Wrong value in metapage of GIN INDEX.

2019-11-05 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Tom Lane. On Tue, Nov 5, 2019 at 3:55 AM Tom Lane wrote: > > "imai.yoshik...@fujitsu.com" writes: > > Moon-san, kuroda.keisuke-san > > On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 8:20 AM, Moon, Insung wrote: > >> The patch is very simple. > >> Fix to increase t

Exposure related to GUC value of ssl_passphrase_command

2019-11-05 Thread Moon, Insung
Deal Hackers. The value of ssl_passphrase_command is set so that an external command is called when the passphrase for decrypting an SSL file such as a private key is obtained. Therefore, easily set to work with echo "passphrase" or call to another get of passphrase application. I think that this

Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

2019-10-31 Thread Moon, Insung
Hello. On Thu, Oct 31, 2019 at 11:25 PM Masahiko Sawada wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 6, 2019 at 3:34 PM Smith, Peter > wrote: > > > > -Original Message- > > From: Masahiko Sawada Sent: Thursday, 15 August > > 2019 7:10 PM > > > > > BTW I've created PoC patch for cluster encryption feature.

Re: Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and encrypted files

2019-10-08 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Antonin Houska. Thank you for your attention to thie matter. On Wed, Oct 9, 2019 at 2:42 PM Antonin Houska wrote: > > Moon, Insung wrote: > > > Hello. > > > > On Tue, Oct 8, 2019 at 8:52 PM Antonin Houska wrote: > > > > > > Robert Haas wrote:

Re: Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and encrypted files

2019-10-08 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear hackers. First, I don't know which email thread should written a reply, therefore using the first email thread. Sorry about the inconvenience... Sawada-san and I have previously researched the PostgreSQL database cluster file that contains user data. The result has been updated to the WIKI p

Re: Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and encrypted files

2019-10-08 Thread Moon, Insung
Hello. On Tue, Oct 8, 2019 at 8:52 PM Antonin Houska wrote: > > Robert Haas wrote: > > > On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 3:01 PM Antonin Houska wrote: > > > However the design doesn't seem to be stable enough at the > > > moment for coding to make sense. > > > > Well, I think the question is whether wor

Re: Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and encrypted files

2019-10-01 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Magnus Hagander. On Tue, Oct 1, 2019 at 5:37 PM Magnus Hagander wrote: > > > > On Tue, Oct 1, 2019 at 9:33 AM Tels wrote: >> >> Moin, >> >> On 2019-09-30 23:26, Bruce Momjian wrote: >> > For full-cluster Transparent Data Encryption (TDE), the current plan is >> > to encrypt all heap and in

Re: Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and encrypted files

2019-10-01 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Tels. On Tue, Oct 1, 2019 at 4:33 PM Tels wrote: > > Moin, > > On 2019-09-30 23:26, Bruce Momjian wrote: > > For full-cluster Transparent Data Encryption (TDE), the current plan is > > to encrypt all heap and index files, WAL, and all pgsql_tmp (work_mem > > overflow). The plan is: > > > >

Wrong value in metapage of GIN INDEX.

2019-08-29 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Hackers. Kuroda-san and I are interested in the GIN index and have been testing various things. While testing, we are found a little bug. Some cases, the value of nEntries in the metapage was set to the wrong value. This is a reproduce of bug situation. =# SET maintenance_work_mem TO '1MB';

Performance improvement of WAL writing?

2019-08-27 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Hackers. Currently, the XLogWrite function is written in 8k(or 16kb) units regardless of the size of the new record. For example, even if a new record is only 300 bytes, pg_pwrite is called to write data in 8k units (if it cannot be writing on one page is 16kb written). Let's look at the wors

Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

2019-08-25 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Hackers. > Specifically in this case- I went back and tried to figure out what > other database systems have an "encrypt EVERYTHING" option. I didn't > have much luck finding one though. So I think we need to ask ourselves- > the "check box" that we're trying to check off with TDE, do the

Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

2019-08-25 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Hackers. It's been a long time since I sent a mail. On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 9:27 AM Bruce Momjian wrote: > On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 10:35:17AM -0400, Stephen Frost wrote: > > > Agreed. The features of other databases are a clear source for what we > > > should consider and run through the u

RE: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

2019-02-06 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Ibrar Ahmed. From: Ibrar Ahmed [mailto:ibrar.ah...@gmail.com] Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2019 4:09 AM To: Moon, Insung Cc: Tom Lane; PostgreSQL-development Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS) On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 5:37

RE: Typo: pgbench.c

2019-01-22 Thread Moon, Insung
> -Original Message- > From: Michael Paquier [mailto:mich...@paquier.xyz] > Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2019 3:01 PM > To: Moon, Insung > Cc: 'Pg Hackers' > Subject: Re: Typo: pgbench.c > > On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:18:49PM +0900, Moon, Insung wrote

Typo: pgbench.c

2019-01-22 Thread Moon, Insung
. Moon, insung NIPPON TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION NTT Open Source Software Center typo-pgbench.patch Description: Binary data

RE: Typo: llvm*.cpp files identified as llvm*.c

2019-01-22 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Hackers. > -Original Message- > From: Thomas Munro [mailto:thomas.mu...@enterprisedb.com] > Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2019 9:38 AM > To: Amit Langote > Cc: Andres Freund; Pg Hackers > Subject: Re: Typo: llvm*.cpp files identified as llvm*.c > > On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 1:16 PM Amit

RE: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

2018-07-03 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Tom Lane. > -Original Message- > From: Tom Lane [mailto:t...@sss.pgh.pa.us] > Sent: Monday, June 18, 2018 11:52 PM > To: Robert Haas > Cc: Joe Conway; Masahiko Sawada; Moon, Insung; PostgreSQL-development > Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryp

RE: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

2018-07-03 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Joe. > -Original Message- > From: Joe Conway [mailto:m...@joeconway.com] > Sent: Monday, June 18, 2018 9:30 PM > To: Masahiko Sawada > Cc: Moon, Insung; PostgreSQL-development > Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key > Ma

RE: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

2018-07-03 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Takayuki Tsunakawa. > -Original Message- > From: Tsunakawa, Takayuki [mailto:tsunakawa.ta...@jp.fujitsu.com] > Sent: Thursday, June 14, 2018 9:58 AM > To: 'Tomas Vondra'; Moon, Insung; pgsql-hack...@postgresql.org > Subject: RE: [Proposal] Table-level Transpa

RE: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

2018-07-03 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Tomas Vondra. > -Original Message- > From: Tomas Vondra [mailto:tomas.von...@2ndquadrant.com] > Sent: Wednesday, June 13, 2018 10:03 PM > To: Masahiko Sawada; Moon, Insung > Cc: PostgreSQL-development; Joe Conway > Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Da

RE: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

2018-07-03 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Tomas Vondra. > -Original Message- > From: Tomas Vondra [mailto:tomas.von...@2ndquadrant.com] > Sent: Wednesday, June 13, 2018 10:15 PM > To: Moon, Insung; pgsql-hack...@postgresql.org > Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Ke

RE: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

2018-07-03 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Masahiko Sawada. > -Original Message- > From: Masahiko Sawada [mailto:sawada.m...@gmail.com] > Sent: Monday, June 11, 2018 6:22 PM > To: Moon, Insung > Cc: PostgreSQL-development; Joe Conway > Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and

RE: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

2018-07-03 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Aleksander Alekseev. > -Original Message- > From: Aleksander Alekseev [mailto:a.aleks...@postgrespro.ru] > Sent: Thursday, May 31, 2018 10:33 PM > To: Moon, Insung > Cc: pgsql-hack...@postgresql.org > Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryp

RE: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

2018-07-03 Thread Moon, Insung
Dear Antonin Houska. > -Original Message- > From: Antonin Houska [mailto:a...@cybertec.at] > Sent: Tuesday, May 29, 2018 3:23 PM > To: Moon, Insung > Cc: pgsql-hack...@postgresql.org > Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key > Ma

[Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

2018-05-25 Thread Moon, Insung
iki/Key_management#Key_Management_System [3] What does CBC-Mode mean? > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation [4] Recently discussed mail https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CA%2BCSw_tb3bk5i7if6inZFc3yyf%2B9HEVNTy51QFBoeUk7UE_V%3Dw%40mail.gmail.com Regards. Mo

RE: [HACKERS][PATCH]pg_buffercache add a buffer state column, Add fuction to decode buffer state

2017-11-14 Thread Moon Insung
ENT} - It's right? If it is correct, I'll modify patch ASAP. Regards. Moon. > -Original Message- > From: Andres Freund [mailto:and...@anarazel.de] > Sent: Tuesday, November 14, 2017 6:07 PM > To: Moon Insung > Cc: 'PostgreSQL Hackers' > Subject: Re: [

[PATCH]pg_buffercache add a buffer state column, Add fuction to decode buffer state

2017-11-14 Thread Moon Insung
Dear Hackers. I'm studied PostgreSQL buffers for the development of new patches. In particular, using pg_buffercache, is can easily check the status of actual buffer. Bur there was one inconvenience. Pg_buffercache was also to check only the dirty state of the buffer. State of the buffer curren