On Fri, Mar 26, 2004 at 09:26:45AM -0500, Dan Sugalski wrote:
: Yup. Subroutines and methods are privilege boundaries, and code with
: extra rights may call into less privileged code safely. We need to
: work out the mechanism though.
One thing you'll have to do in that case is disable the abili
At 2:57 PM +0100 3/26/04, James Mastros wrote:
Larry Wall wrote:
Do bear in mind that Perl can execute bits of code as it's compiling,
so if a bit of code is untrustworthy, you shouldn't be compiling it
in the first place, unless you've prescanned it to reject C,
C, and other macro definitions, or
Larry Wall wrote:
Do bear in mind that Perl can execute bits of code as it's compiling,
so if a bit of code is untrustworthy, you shouldn't be compiling it
in the first place, unless you've prescanned it to reject C,
C, and other macro definitions, or (more usefully) have hooks
in the compiler to c
At 11:35 PM +0200 3/25/04, Jarkko Hietaniemi wrote:
Rafael Garcia-Suarez wrote:
prevent
eval 'while(1){}'
or
eval '$x = "take this!" x 1_000_000'
Or hog both (for a small while):
eval 'while([EMAIL PROTECTED],0){}'
Which, if the interpreter's running with quotas, will be caught wh
Rafael Garcia-Suarez wrote:
>> prevent
> eval 'while(1){}'
> or
> eval '$x = "take this!" x 1_000_000'
Or hog both (for a small while):
eval 'while([EMAIL PROTECTED],0){}'
> or my personal favourite, the always funny
> eval 'CORE::dump()'
> unless you set up a very restrictive
Larry Wall wrote in perl.perl6.internals :
> Do bear in mind that Perl can execute bits of code as it's compiling,
> so if a bit of code is untrustworthy, you shouldn't be compiling it
> in the first place, unless you've prescanned it to reject C,
> C, and other macro definitions, or (more usefully
Do bear in mind that Perl can execute bits of code as it's compiling,
so if a bit of code is untrustworthy, you shouldn't be compiling it
in the first place, unless you've prescanned it to reject C,
C, and other macro definitions, or (more usefully) have hooks
in the compiler to catch and validate
At 1:06 PM -0500 3/24/04, Joe Schaefer wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dan Sugalski) writes:
At 5:48 PM -0500 3/23/04, Joe Schaefer wrote:
[...]
>IMO, the advantage would be that parrot apps will have a better idea
>of what security model is appropriate.
Well... maybe.
Parrot apps don't get a who
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It can be safe. Normally, PCC works by certifying the code during
compilation, and attaching the machine-checkable certificate with the
resulting compiled code (be that bytecode, machine code or whatever).
During runtime, a certificate checker then validates the certif
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dan Sugalski) writes:
> At 5:48 PM -0500 3/23/04, Joe Schaefer wrote:
[...]
> >IMO, the advantage would be that parrot apps will have a better idea
> >of what security model is appropriate.
>
> Well... maybe.
>
> Parrot apps don't get a whole lot of say here--this is more on
On 25/03/2004, at 2:39 PM, Steve Fink wrote:
On Mar-24, Dan Sugalski wrote:
At 12:36 PM +1100 3/24/04, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 24/03/2004, at 6:38 AM, Dan Sugalski wrote:
This is a question without a simple answer, but does Parrot provide
an infrastructure so that it would be possible to have
On Mar-24, Dan Sugalski wrote:
> At 12:36 PM +1100 3/24/04, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >On 24/03/2004, at 6:38 AM, Dan Sugalski wrote:
> >
> >This is a question without a simple answer, but does Parrot provide
> >an infrastructure so that it would be possible to have
> >proof-carrying[1] Parrot b
Dan Sugalski wrote:
>
> If we're going to tackle this, though, we need to pull in some folks
> who're actually competent at it before we do more than handwave about
> the design.
A Language-Based Approach to Security (2000)
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/schneider00languagebased.html
Linux Securi
At 12:36 PM +1100 3/24/04, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 24/03/2004, at 6:38 AM, Dan Sugalski wrote:
At any rate, perl 5's Safe module is a good example of the Wrong
Way to do security, and as such we're going to take it as a
cautionary tale rather than a template. For security I want to go
with
At 5:48 PM -0500 3/23/04, Joe Schaefer wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dan Sugalski) writes:
[...]
#s 3&4 deal with security. This... this is a dodgier issue. Security's
easy to get wrong and hard to get right. (Though quotas are
straightforward enough. Mostly) And once the framework's in place,
th
At 2:50 PM + 3/24/04, Rafael Garcia-Suarez wrote:
Dan Sugalski wrote in perl.perl6.internals :
At 2:50 PM +0100 3/24/04, Leopold Toetsch wrote:
Dan Sugalski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
At any rate, perl 5's Safe module is a good example of the Wrong Way
to do security, and as such we're go
Dan Sugalski wrote in perl.perl6.internals :
> At 2:50 PM +0100 3/24/04, Leopold Toetsch wrote:
>>Dan Sugalski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>> At any rate, perl 5's Safe module is a good example of the Wrong Way
>>> to do security, and as such we're going to take it as a cautionary
>>> tale ra
At 2:50 PM +0100 3/24/04, Leopold Toetsch wrote:
Dan Sugalski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
At any rate, perl 5's Safe module is a good example of the Wrong Way
to do security, and as such we're going to take it as a cautionary
tale rather than a template.
Ok. What about Ponie?
What about it? Safe
Dan Sugalski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> At any rate, perl 5's Safe module is a good example of the Wrong Way
> to do security, and as such we're going to take it as a cautionary
> tale rather than a template.
Ok. What about Ponie?
leo
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dan Sugalski) writes:
[...]
> #s 3&4 deal with security. This... this is a dodgier issue. Security's
> easy to get wrong and hard to get right. (Though quotas are
> straightforward enough. Mostly) And once the framework's in place,
> there's the issue of performance--how do we
On 24/03/2004, at 6:38 AM, Dan Sugalski wrote:
At any rate, perl 5's Safe module is a good example of the Wrong Way
to do security, and as such we're going to take it as a cautionary
tale rather than a template. For security I want to go with an
explicit privilege model with privilege checking
> > At any rate, perl 5's Safe module is a good example of the Wrong Way
> to do security, and as such we're going to take it as a cautionary
> tale rather than a template. For security I want to go with an
> explicit privilege model with privilege checking in parrot's
> internals, rather than
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