Hi,
I would like to apologize for the late timing in providing the following
comments.
The Security Considerations section of RFC 8907 properly describes TACACS+
scrambling mechanism and associated impacts. This tacacs-tls draft addresses
*this* specific issue by replacing the scrambling mecha
Dear All,
I support the adoption of this draft.
Regards.
Mauro Cociglio
-Original Message-
From: Henk Birkholz
mailto:henk.birkholz@ietf.contact>>
Sent: Wednesday, June 26, 2024 11:59 AM
To: OPSAWG mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>>
Subject: [OPSAWG]🔔 WG Adoption Call for draft-gfz-opsawg-
Hi Arnaud,
The need for enhancing the flow for SSH key authentication is clear, and the
initial version of the document covered this to some degree. However, after
discussion in the group the doc was split to cover TLS (as a priority), and a
second document that is in preparation for SSH keys.
Hi Douglas,
Thanks for that feedback.
As you pointed, current state of the art is to provision users and their keys
on the devices (up to the limits those devices have in term of number of keys
and the burden of deploying and maintaining that on a large set of equipment)
and not to use TACACS+
That is certainly reasonable, we will add.
From: EBALARD Arnaud
Date: Monday, 1 July 2024 at 12:21
To: Douglas Gash (dcmgash) , opsawg@ietf.org
Cc: Thorsten Dahm , John Heasly ,
Andrej Ota
Subject: RE: OPSAWG Digest, Vol 205, Issue 21
Hi Douglas,
Thanks for that feedback.
As you pointed, cu
Reviewer: Russ Housley
Review result: Not Ready
I reviewed this document as part of the Security Directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area
Directors. Document authors, document
