> > > Here's a simple thing: when your "agents" connect to the server, have
> > > the server create a symmetric key (e.g., 3DES) and send it back to the
> > > client.
>
> > That isn't good example. First, there is one additional connection
between
> > server and client. Second, attacker could be ge
> > Here's a simple thing: when your "agents" connect to the server, have
> > the server create a symmetric key (e.g., 3DES) and send it back to the
> > client.
> That isn't good example. First, there is one additional connection between
> server and client. Second, attacker could be get a key bec
> > how can I properly secure small anonymous UDP transmissions?
>
> I don't know what you mean by this. Are you sure you mean anonymous?
>
> Here's a simple thing: when your "agents" connect to the server, have
> the server create a symmetric key (e.g., 3DES) and send it back to the
> client. Whe
> Well, what I meant by anonymous was that they're connection-less, and
> with the nature of UDP, the tracker can't be quite sure that they are
> who they claim to be.
Anonymous has nothing to do with connection-less or not.
If the server is going to decode the packets that the client encrypts,
t
On Mar 23, 2004, at 16:10, Rich Salz wrote:
how can I properly secure small anonymous UDP transmissions?
I don't know what you mean by this. Are you sure you mean anonymous?
Well, what I meant by anonymous was that they're connection-less, and
with the nature of UDP, the tracker can't be quite s
