Re: impact of client certificates to re-negotiation attack

2010-01-19 Thread Steffen DETTMER
* Kyle Hamilton wrote on Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 12:03 -0800: > * Steffen asked... > > ...on this level [thanks a lot again for all the clarifications: authentication levels, authentication-agnostic, URI-dependent certificates, bugfix because missed intention, MITM tricks twitter to decrypt and disclo

Re: impact of client certificates to re-negotiation attack

2010-01-14 Thread Kyle Hamilton
On Wed, Jan 13, 2010 at 6:34 AM, Steffen DETTMER wrote: > * aerow...@gmail.com wrote on Tue, Jan 12, 2010 at 12:29 -0800: >> On Tue, Jan 12, 2010 at 3:12 AM, Steffen DETTMER >> The problem is this: >> >> The attacker makes a connection to a TLS-enabled server, >> sending no certificate.  It sends

Re: impact of client certificates to re-negotiation attack

2010-01-13 Thread Steffen DETTMER
* aerow...@gmail.com wrote on Tue, Jan 12, 2010 at 12:29 -0800: > On Tue, Jan 12, 2010 at 3:12 AM, Steffen DETTMER > The problem is this: > > The attacker makes a connection to a TLS-enabled server, > sending no certificate. It sends a command that, for whatever > reason, needs additional privil

Re: impact of client certificates to re-negotiation attack (was: Re: Re-negotiation handshake failed: Not accepted by client!?)

2010-01-12 Thread aerowolf
Responses inline. :) On Tue, Jan 12, 2010 at 3:12 AM, Steffen DETTMER wrote: Hi, thank you too for the detailed explanation. But the impact on the client certificates (and its correct validation etc) is not clear to me (so I ask inline in the second half of this mail). * Kyle Hamilton wrote