Re: Security Question

RSA is for authentication. DH key exchange is the way to go for perfect forward secrecy. For non-DH exchange protocols, the RSA key will be enough to read the server side of the connection (receive and transmit). -Kyle H On 5/25/06, Sreeram Kandallu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Thanks! looks l

Re: Security Question

Hello, > Is it possible to decrypt a recorded SSL session, if the attacker gains > access to the RSA private keys at a later point in time? If key_exchange was done with RSA and server RSA private key was compromised ... without problem. Best regards, -- Marek Marcola <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> __

Re: Security Question

Thanks! looks like RSA+DH is the way to go for perfect forward secrecy! Sreeram signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature

Re: Security Question

Related note: you can explicitly request re-keying at any time, and should do it periodically on long-term connections. That makes analysis even more expensive since there's less data and less payoff. Victor Duchovni wrote: For all these ciphers the attacker has to brute force the symmetric k

Re: Security Question

Thats cool..they do have DH ...a quick look suggested a premaster secret(randomly choosen). Dint seem like theres a DH exchange Sudharsan Sudharsan On 5/25/06, Victor Duchovni <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On Fri, May 26, 2006 at 07:23:05AM +0530, Sreeram Kandallu wrote: > Hi All > > Is it possi

Re: Security Question

I don't have the details at hand, but look at "perfect forward secrecy" in "SSL and TLS", Rescorla. Sreeram Kandallu wrote: Hi All Is it possible to decrypt a recorded SSL session, if the attacker gains access to the RSA private keys at a later point in time? If yes, what would be the best wa

Re: Security Question

On Fri, May 26, 2006 at 07:23:05AM +0530, Sreeram Kandallu wrote: > Hi All > > Is it possible to decrypt a recorded SSL session, if the attacker gains > access to the RSA private keys at a later point in time? If yes, what > would be the best way to avoid this? $ ciphers='kEDH:!aNULL:!LOW:!E

Re: Security Question

well..i took a quick look and the client chooses a premaster secret and the various keys are a function of it..doesnt look like theres any scope for a DH exchange..Maybe some of the experienced security pple can help Sudharsan On 5/25/06, Sudharsan Rangarajan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I must a

Re: Security Question

I must apologize for not being SSL specific..But it gives u a hint and u can take a look at the SSL specs and see what they allow. Sudharsan On 5/25/06, Sudharsan Rangarajan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Im not sure if SSL gives u such options, but the best way to prevent compromise of a RSA key w

Re: Security Question

Im not sure if SSL gives u such options, but the best way to prevent compromise of a RSA key would be to establish a diffie hellman key. You would want to do a shared secret anyawy..and im sure SSL does it..if the shared secret is computed using diffie hellman and nobody gets hold of the exponents