Re: Securing a CA

2004-04-23 Thread Charles B Cranston
Mark H. Wood wrote: Um, feel free to point me elsewhere, but I'm having trouble visualizing what's being discussed. I keep reading "branched certificate chain", but what I understood from the description is like this: Before:OurRoot ---> Level1 ---> EndUsers After: IdenT

Re: Securing a CA

2004-04-22 Thread Mark H. Wood
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Um, feel free to point me elsewhere, but I'm having trouble visualizing what's being discussed. I keep reading "branched certificate chain", but what I understood from the description is like this: Before:OurRoot ---> Level1 --->

Re: Securing a CA

2004-04-21 Thread Rich Salz
However, I must ask the question: "Have you actually DONE this before?" Yup. But not with SSL and browsers. You're focused on that, but I was talking in general. In reality, of course, everyone just buys a commercial SSL cert rather than try to fight with the browsers's (sic!) trust issues.

Re: Securing a CA

2004-04-21 Thread Charles B Cranston
Rich Salz wrote: I was envisioning something much simpler. Existing applications that know about the "root" CA work without configuration changes. New applications that need to know about the new "larger" PKI just add the new root to their list of trust anchors. I suppose that's really a bri

Re: Securing a CA

2004-04-21 Thread Rich Salz
I was envisioning something much simpler. Existing applications that know about the "root" CA work without configuration changes. New applications that need to know about the new "larger" PKI just add the new root to their list of trust anchors. I suppose that's really a bridge-CA. I don't t

Re: Securing a CA

2004-04-21 Thread Charles B Cranston
Actually, it might be as easy as changing the "name" of the root and issuing a new L1 certificate. The branch happens when an unmodified client (which still has the local root installed) needs to decide who has signed the L1 certificate. Its two choices are 1. the local root 2. the "missing link

Re: Securing a CA

2004-04-21 Thread Charles B Cranston
Follow up to previous posting: I did try to do some experimentation in the context of trying to design a clean transition from the root we made in 1998 to the root I made in 2003. I did not have a great deal of success because the browsers I was working with at the time (Netscape 4.7x and IE 4 or

Re: Securing a CA

2004-04-21 Thread Charles B Cranston
Rich Salz wrote: At the risk of being immodest, you might find this column useful: http://webservices.xml.com/pub/a/ws/2003/12/09/salz.html This is a verbatim quote from the text at that URL: > The root will sign the Level 1 CA and then be taken offline. > Anyone who wants to validate any iden

Re: Securing a CA

2004-04-20 Thread Rich Salz
> I need some info about the protocols or standars for securing a CA Root At the risk of being immodest, you might find this column useful: http://webservices.xml.com/pub/a/ws/2003/12/09/salz.html /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology ht