Porting guide from 0.9.x to 1.x

Hello,      Is there a porting guide for porting 0.9.x to 1.x version of OpenSSL especially to be used with the latest FIPS module?  For an example, it appears that SHA1_Init... cannot be used in FIPS mode and EVP_MD_... API should be used instead. Thank you, -Pandit

Re: Question regarding OpenSSL Security Advisory

Thank you David and Nivedita. I think I got it. -Pandit From: Nivedita Melinkeri To: Pandit Panburana Cc: openssl-users@openssl.org Sent: Thu, November 18, 2010 1:53:22 PM Subject: Re: Question regarding OpenSSL Security Advisory Hey Pandit, > So

Re: Question regarding OpenSSL Security Advisory

Hi, I am not clear about the condition that vulnerability when using internal session caching mechanism. Is it the same thing as TLS session caching or this is some thing different? Thank you, - Pandit From: David Schwartz To: openssl-users@openssl.org C

FIPS self-test failure possibilities

Hello, I would like to know whether any one have seen FIPS self-test failures on the platforms you work on assuming that the code has been properly ported i.e. failures found during porting do not count. Thank you, - Pandit

Re: FIPS linked as a shared library

I have not seen an answer to this mail. Wouldn't applying "PIC" accomplish the same thing? Thank you, -Pandit From: William A. Rowe Jr. To: openssl-users@openssl.org Cc: Kyle Hamilton Sent: Mon, January 18, 2010 6:20:11 PM Subject: Re: FIPS linked as a shar

Re: RSA algorithm with big endian environment

OpenSSL works fine on MIPS. MIPS is a big endian CPU. -Pandit From: Alessandro Borga To: openssl-users@openssl.org Sent: Thu, October 15, 2009 10:37:39 AM Subject: RSA algorithm with big endian environment Well I must use RSA encrypt/decprypt functions in

Re: Question regarding TLS

Hello Erik, The authentication occurs during the initial setup of TLS session (handshake phase). If the peer (or peers in case of mutual authentication) is authenticated then both sides agree in a common secrets for the session as part handshake phase. The messages sent in the authentica

Re: Prevent concurrent operator in FIPS mode

validated crypto to zero, as well, so I dunno where the balance lies. Neither does Steve M, and he's pretty much openssl's most visible diplomat to the Priesthood of the CMVP. -Kyle H On Wed, Aug 19, 2009 at 9:27 AM, Pandit Panburana wrote: > Hello, > The security policy of s

Prevent concurrent operator in FIPS mode

Hello, The security policy of states that the module does not allow concurrent operators. How does API prevent concurrent operator? Thank you, -Pandit

Re: FIPS 14-2 vs MD5

I could be wrong with this but I think it might be possible to use MD5 for the purpose of checksum (fancy). I also believe HMAC_MD5 part of SSL/TLS is acceptable. Regards, - Pandit From: David Schwartz To: openssl-users@openssl.org Sent: Monday, August 17,

Re: OpenSSL FIPS Module version 1.2

FIPS Module version 1.2 On Fri, Aug 14, 2009, Pandit Panburana wrote: > Hello, > > I have a few questions about the FIPS module. > >1) The current version of OpenSSL FIPS Module is 1.2. It is based on >0.9.8e and 0.9.8f of standard OpenSSL. The latest stable vers

Re: OpenSSL FIPS Module version 1.2

and then get the result blesse^Wvalidated. -Kyle H On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 12:54 PM, Pandit Panburana wrote: > Hello, > I have a few questions about the FIPS module. >1) The current version of OpenSSL FIPS Module is 1.2. It is based on > 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f of standard OpenSSL. The

OpenSSL FIPS Module version 1.2

Hello, I have a few questions about the FIPS module. 1) The current version of OpenSSL FIPS Module is 1.2. It is based on 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f of standard OpenSSL. The latest stable version is 0.9.8k. How are fixes get into validated FIPS module? 2) The current procedure suggests that