> authentication systems. People say they would rather implement
> something based on public keys than Kerberos because Kerberos has a
> higher administrative cost and the cross realm work is too high.
>
> As far as I can tell the work levels are equivalent.
Even if the work levels are equivale
I'm not certain that using the subjectAltNames field is the "proper"
thing to do.
The problem I see is that you may wish to use a certificate at more
than one site, with possibly different usernames.
Even if you can store an arbitrarily long list of local usernames
in *any* of the fields in a
forward all of these to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> Would sombody like to shoot Oracle Corp with a silver bullet?
>
> On 21 Oct 1999 11:34:47 -0700, ORAPOST wrote:
>
> >The included message could not be delivered to the following invalid mail names.
>Please verify these names and try them
> again
Ahh, this sentence from the article seems to undermine the "good
tidings" that the announcement *seemed* to be bringing:
"Under the new rules, such products with strong encryption features
would undergo only a one-time review"
I read that as saying every program using strong encryption mus
