Re: [openssl-users] openssl verify accepting CA certs issued by intermediate with CA:TRUE, pathlen:0

2018-10-03 Thread Peter Magnusson
The following test case attempts to validates evilserver.pem, issued by evilca.pem. evil*.pem is violating: 1/ pathlen=0 constraint of the compromised intermediate.pem (issuer of evilserver.pem) 2/ pathlen=1 constraint of the non-compromised root-ca.pem (issuer of intermediate.pem) The particular

Re: [openssl-users] SubjectAltName syntax in openssl.cnf

2018-10-03 Thread DUPALUT, Benjamin
Hi Dave, Thank you for your answer. Cordialement, *Benjamin Dupalut* Ingénieur système et réseau Service Informatique, Télécommunications, Audiovisuel et Reprographie (SITAR) ESIEE Paris 2 bd Blaise Pascal - 93162 Noisy-le-Grand Cedex T : +33 1 45 92 66 17 benjamin.dupa...@esiee.fr www.esiee.fr

Re: [openssl-users] openssl verify accepting CA certs issued by intermediate with CA:TRUE, pathlen:0

2018-10-03 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Wed, Oct 03, 2018 at 02:51:57PM +0200, Peter Magnusson wrote: > $ openssl verify -verbose -CAfile root.pem -untrusted intermediate.pem > evil.pem > evil.pem: OK This is expected to work when intermediate.pem has pathlen 0, because you're verifying "evil.pem" as a *leaf* certificate, its CA:tr

[openssl-users] openssl verify accepting CA certs issued by intermediate with CA:TRUE, pathlen:0

2018-10-03 Thread Peter Magnusson
Hi, It is my understanding "openssl verify" should raise X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED should be raised if pathlen=0 intermediate issues a new CA, but that does not seem to occur when I test with a couple pf openssl versions. I am not sure due to limited understanding of the code, but I am wonde