On 07/01/2016 23:06, jonetsu wrote:
Does this mean that running 1.01e in FIPS mode is protected regarding this
SLOTH attack ?
Does FIPS mode prevent use of MD5: Yes.
Does FIPS mode prevent insecure uses of SHA-1 (a FIPS
algorithm): No.
Does FIPS mode prevent the SSL/TLS handshake from using
96
Does this mean that running 1.01e in FIPS mode is protected regarding this
SLOTH attack ?
--
View this message in context:
http://openssl.6102.n7.nabble.com/openSSL-and-SLOTH-attack-tp62055p62074.html
Sent from the OpenSSL - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com.
___
On 07/01/2016 16:46, Michael Wojcik wrote:
As described on that web page, use OpenSSL 1.0.1f or later. That prevents the
currently-practical SLOTH attack against RSA-MD5 client authentication.
If you're using an OpenSSL release earlier than 1.0.1f, SLOTH is probably not
your biggest problem.
Michael Wojcik writes:
>
> As described on that web page, use OpenSSL 1.0.1f or later. That prevents
the currently-practical SLOTH
> attack against RSA-MD5 client authentication.
>
> If you're using an OpenSSL release earlier than 1.0.1f, SLOTH is probably
not your biggest problem.
>
> The au
Sorry - I thought this topic had come up again (or that this was a new
continuation of the older discussion). Now I see it was an old message that had
been delayed. Apologies for the noise.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
___
op
> On Jan 7, 2016, at 1:39 PM, Ken Goldman wrote:
>
> 3 - I use this sequence:
>
> x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509
> EVP_PKEY = X509_get_pubkey
> RSA = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA
>
> What should be freed? All three structures or just a subset?
All three.
--
Viktor.
__
Meta-comment: The documentation is very thin on when objects should or
should not be freed. The application developer is forced to chose
between [don't free, leak memory] and [free, access freed memory].
~~
1 - The documentation here says this API is available, but I don't see
it in either
I'm moving samba service between a couple of FreeBSD systems (9.3 to
10.2), and I'm stuck on getting samba on the new machine to connect to
our openldap server over ssl - frustrating since I've been running
samba+ldap for 15 years or so; feel sure I'm missing something basic!
The smbd-to-ldap
> A few zombie messages today:
There were some that had been held up on the queue because of things like size
limits.
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On 07/01/2016 15:52, Michael Wojcik wrote:
The proposed change:
--
static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a)
{
-return 0 - (a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1));
+ return (((unsigned)((int)(a) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1;
}
-
produces an implementation-defined value in C99
The proposed change:
--
static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a)
{
-return 0 - (a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1));
+ return (((unsigned)((int)(a) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1;
}
-
produces an implementation-defined value in C99. See the final sentence of ISO
9899-1999 6.
Hello users,
Is there any fixes available from openSSL community for the SLOTH attack -
http://www.mitls.org/pages/attacks/SLOTH
or what are the possible mitigation points?
Thanks
Sandeep
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