David Schwartz wrote:
2) Streams of entangled particles can generate shared
secrets where none previously existed.
No, not really, since the scheme described on page 80 of the Jan 2005
Scientific American looks vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
In that case, it generates two shared secret
David Schwartz wrote:
2) Streams of entangled particles can generate shared
secrets where none
previously existed.
No, not really, since the scheme described on page 80 of the Jan 2005
Scientific American looks vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
In that case, it generates t
> > 2) Streams of entangled particles can generate shared
> > secrets where none
> > previously existed.
>
> No, not really, since the scheme described on page 80 of the Jan 2005
> Scientific American looks vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
In that case, it generates two share
David Schwartz wrote:
Do you agree that:
1) If there exists a shared secret, quantum encryption can provide
protection, now and in the future, against MITM attacks or passive
interception.
I believe so, now that I've read your description.
2) Streams of entangled particles can gen
Sorry about all the confusion Dave, the scheme described on
page 80 of the January 2005 Scientific American is a key
distribution scheme that, at least as far as I can tell from
a quick re-read, IS vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
Perhaps there is some defense that was simplified out of th
> 3. QE and man in the middle
>
> NOW we are in a position to see how the combination of QE and
> key mixing can actually buy us something! Consider the plight
> of the man in the middle when both are being used. She cannot
> passively eavesdrop and record for further analysis because of
> the n
David: have had another read of your message of 1/4 and realize
I was talking about something different than what you were
talking about, hence my confusion. Cannot put my hands on my
copy of that Scientific American article, but what you describe
at the end of your article seems much stronger tha
Strangely enough, there actually MIGHT be a good reason to use
Quantum Encryption. It's a very subtle point, which I will try
to explain succinctly below, but unless you're actually interested
you might want to hit the delete key now.
1. Perfect Forward Security
I hate to invoke "Perfect Forward S
Davy Durham wrote:
Hi, I'd like to know if something's possible using the openssl SSL
library.
I have a server running use the OpenSSL library with a cert and
private installed. Now the client code (also using the OpenSSL
library) so far has just been connecting to the server and assuming
that
