Re: Question about Browser Authenticity

1999-11-15 Thread Terrell Larson
I think the short answer is that the user won't know - this is the practical answer. The technical answer is the the user must be able to run an app such at MD5 against the browser code that will confirm that the browser is legit. But of course the md5 app might have been compromised and par

Question about Browser Authenticity

1999-11-15 Thread Harry Whitehouse
This may be slightly off-topic, so let me apologize in advance. The SSL protocol requires that the client side (say a browser) use appropriate crypto to read the server's certificate and verify the signature on the transmitted public key (using the public key of a trusted 3rd party such as Verisi

What do YOU use for your cert p/w?

1999-11-15 Thread steve
No, I'm not asking what your password is. But some people gotta have a theme, and I'm wondering what type of text you guys would use for your secure certificate password? A completely random grouping of letters and numbers? Lyrics from an obscure song? Your social security number? (Kidding, ki

Re: Compiling OpenSSL without 3DES

1999-11-15 Thread Bruno Treguier
> But then, can't you just compile everything as normal, and > change the allowed ciphersuites in the configuration..? It surely can't > be illegal to compile the 3DES in, but simply not use it. In fact, that's what I'll plead for, if there is no other simple solution. It may even get acce

Re: CRL and Netscape

1999-11-15 Thread Dr Stephen Henson
Stefano Bergamasco wrote: > > "The error was: The certificate revocation list for this site's certificate > is not yet valid. > Reload a new certificate revocation list." > UserB's e-mail is correctly rejected because: > "The error was: This operation cannot be performed because a required > cert

x509 vs. ca

1999-11-15 Thread Stefan H. Holek
Looking at RSE's mkcert.sh (from mod_ssl) I found that it is obviously *not* required to use the ca command to sign a CSR with a CA's certificate; this can very well be done with the x509 command. OTOH, the ca command seems to be the only way to create a CRL. Is this observation correct? The crl

Re: RSA Security and Red Hat, Inc. Sign Licensing Agreement

1999-11-15 Thread carson
> "William" == William H Geiger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: William> I am rather confused as to why Red Hat would go with a closed, proprietary William> crypto library instead of going with OpenSSL, doesn't seem to be the Linux William> way. Because if they used OpenSSL, they could be sued f

CRL and Netscape

1999-11-15 Thread Stefano Bergamasco
I am working with CRLs and signatures in e-mail; I have the following problem with Netscape Messenger (4.61) I emitted two certificates (say UserA and UserB). I gave them to a couple of friends. UserA wrote me a signed e-mail. After that I revoked UserB's certificate and published a CRL. Then I t

Compiling DLLs

1999-11-15 Thread Joaquin Vidal Balanza
Howdy all, I'm trying to build a dll using OpenSSL (of course). In the installation notes for the w32 platform there was a special note: ... One final comment about compiling applications linked to the OpenSSL library. If you don't use the multithreaded DLL runtime library (/MD option) your p

Re: Compiling OpenSSL without 3DES

1999-11-15 Thread Ben Laurie
Nicolas Roumiantzeff wrote: > > Could you describe this "meet-in-the-middle" attack on the 3-DES? OK, well, it's a known-plaintext attack. You encrypt the known plaintext with all 2^56 possible keys for the first step, and store the results. You then decrypt the ciphertext with all 2^112 possibl

Re: Compiling OpenSSL without 3DES

1999-11-15 Thread Nicolas Roumiantzeff
Could you describe this "meet-in-the-middle" attack on the 3-DES? Nicolas Roumiantzeff. -Message d'origine- De : Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> À : [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date : vendredi 12 novembre 1999 20:13 Objet : Re: Compiling OpenSSL without 3DES >Nicolas Roumiantz

AW: Compiling OpenSSL without 3DES

1999-11-15 Thread anssi . bragge
>The point is that _the French law_ says: "Thou shalt not use a keylength >greater than 128 bits". There's no room for interpretation, here. Even if >I invented my own cipher, no matter how rotten it might be (why not use >XOR ? ;-)) ), I simply wouldn't be allowed to use a 129 bit key ! It's

Re: POP3 server with SSL HOWTO

1999-11-15 Thread Carlos Horowicz
I'm using this w/UW imapd: http://www.hitachi-ms.co.jp/bjorb/en/ Cheers, Carlos Emilian Medve wrote: > Thank you. > > Emil. > > __ > OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org > User Support Maili

Re: Compiling OpenSSL without 3DES

1999-11-15 Thread Ben Laurie
Bruno Treguier wrote: > I've got another question about 3DES and SSL: isn't the SSL protocol limited > to a 128 bit keylength ? If this is true, how is 3DES handled ? Is the 3rd > key only partially used ? Or is the "key1, key2, key1" scheme used ? The simple answer is that SSL isn't limited to 1

Re: Compiling OpenSSL without 3DES

1999-11-15 Thread Nicolas Roumiantzeff
But for the French authorities you would have to prove taht DES is a group. Beside, the 3-DES implementation used in SSL is not exactly a composition of 3 DES function (the initial and final seps of the DES algorithm are done only once instead of 3 times). Nicolas Roumiantzeff. >And whether 3-D

Re: Compiling OpenSSL without 3DES

1999-11-15 Thread Bruno Treguier
Ben: > > Anyway, French laws aren't that specific. All they talk about is a > > "key length", so even if you're right, Ben, I don't want to get into > > trouble just because a pen pusher will have made the wrong assumption. > > ;-) > > That's up to you, but I don't know _anyone_ who thinks that