On Thu, 26 Jan 2012, Roland van Rijswijk wrote:
Seconded, ECC is a good alternative to RSA and should drastically reduce
on-the-wire sizes of signatures and DNSKEY sets. And ECC is on the way (but not
there yet) for DNSSEC: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-04.
Wonder if it w
On 26 jan 2012, at 03:11, Paul Wouters wrote:
> On Wed, 25 Jan 2012, Ondřej Surý wrote:
>
>> Why sad? I think it's useful to discuss this once in a while. Also because
>> it looks like (for outsider) that cryptographers are like lawyers. You ask
>> 5 lawyers about something and you get 7 diffe
On Wed, 25 Jan 2012, Ondřej Surý wrote:
Why sad? I think it's useful to discuss this once in a while. Also because
it looks like (for outsider) that cryptographers are like lawyers. You ask
5 lawyers about something and you get 7 different opinions :).
The ones I talk to start laughing once
[ Quoting at 12:20 on Jan 25 in "Re: [Opendnssec-user..." ]
> >
> > I always get a bit sad because of these mails... If rsa is vulnerable
>
> Why sad? I think it's useful to discuss this once in a while. Also because
> it looks like (for outsider) that cryptographers are like lawyers. You ask
>
On 01/25/2012 12:44 AM, Rick van Rein wrote:
>
> Miek, I do not agree that DNS is unattractive to crack;
> if I had a grudge against a large industrial firm I could
> try to redirect their traffic to me, and announce being
> near bankrupcy on their website (which would cause panic
> and could ther
On Tue, Jan 24, 2012 at 22:31, Miek Gieben wrote:
>> Any opinions?
>
> I always get a bit sad because of these mails... If rsa is vulnerable
Why sad? I think it's useful to discuss this once in a while. Also because
it looks like (for outsider) that cryptographers are like lawyers. You ask
5 la
>
> Any opinions?
>
>
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc4641bis-08#section-3.4
Which has past WGLC and is on its way to the IESG for more than half a year.
--Olaf
Olaf M. KolkmanNLnet Labs
http:
On 24 Jan 2012, at 23:44, Rick van Rein wrote:
> Once again,
> the infrastructure exists to update a KSK if need be, and
> a knowledgeable resolver operator could stop accepting
> keys if RSA is broken tomorrow.
>
At the moment it often isn't the easiest of processes to get a KSK changed for
Hi,
As others stated: the short lifetime of a ZSK makes it
reasonable to work with 1024 bit; the impact that key
sizes have on efficiency of DNSSEC is big enought to not
want to be paranoid; this is why there is the difference
between ZSK and KSK in the first place. Rather than
looking at conserv
On 24 jan 2012, at 17:15, Ondřej Surý wrote:
> Any opinions?
I very much disagree. There is no reason to stop recommending 1024-bits RSA
keys. I did ask Paul Hoffman, and got the following reply:
"A 1024 bit keys whose value is under US$100M is secure for many years in the
future; see RFC 3766
[ Quoting at 17:15 on Jan 24 in "[Opendnssec-user] De..." ]
> and the result was that <1024 RSA keys are insecure (in fact 512bit
> keys can be factorized on common hardware).
1024 and 512 bits is a bit of a leap in rsa land...
> These numbers are just for 2012 and maybe updated as time changes.
Roland van Rijswijk wrote:
>> we did a small research on a secure and recommended keysizes
>> and the result was that <1024 RSA keys are insecure (in
> fact 512bit > keys can be factorized on common hardware).
>> > We came to conclusion that to be on a safe
> side the default should be: > > ZSK >=
Hi Ondřej,
On 24 jan 2012, at 17:15, Ondřej Surý wrote:
> we did a small research on a secure and recommended keysizes
> and the result was that <1024 RSA keys are insecure (in fact 512bit
> keys can be factorized on common hardware).
>
> We came to conclusion that to be on a safe side the defa
Hi,
we did a small research on a secure and recommended keysizes
and the result was that <1024 RSA keys are insecure (in fact 512bit
keys can be factorized on common hardware).
We came to conclusion that to be on a safe side the default should be:
ZSK >= 1280 bits
KSK >= 2048 bits
With 1024 bit
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