Re: [OAUTH-WG] How could an IdP create an id token for one audience RP without knowing for which RP ?

2017-08-08 Thread Hammann Sven
Dear all, I would like to clarify and agree with John Bradley that there is a confusion here. In the setting that I was discussing in my presentation, I was looking at OpenID Connect, where we have: An end-user with his user agent (browser) that wishes to log in at an RP service (and this

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03.txt

2017-08-08 Thread Vladimir Dzhuvinov
On 07/08/17 19:09, Salz, Rich wrote: >> A while ago, if I'm not mistaken, I glimpsed some report of vulnerabilities >> caused by incorrect public key comparison. > There was a recent issue raised by Hanno about incorrect public/private key > matching leading to incorrect revocation of a certific

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03.txt

2017-08-08 Thread Vladimir Dzhuvinov
On 07/08/17 18:53, John Bradley wrote: > The AS always gets the client cert from the TLS stack. Validating the > certificate cain is something people get wrong all the time. However that > is what the DN names are for. Using those requires validating the certs. For the self-signed certs (pu

[OAUTH-WG] JWT BCP: x5c

2017-08-08 Thread Vladimir Dzhuvinov
This is a classic case for the BCP: https://bitbucket.org/connect2id/nimbus-jose-jwt/issues/230/x5c-path-validation Developer expects that checking the signature of a JWT with a given JWK will also validate the x5c of the JWK. How the developer obtained the JWK in the first place is not clear fro