Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01.txt

2020-11-07 Thread Neil Madden
> On 6 Nov 2020, at 22:02, Brian Campbell wrote: > >  > > >> On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 2:52 PM Brian Campbell >> wrote: >> >>> >>> 9.1: >>> This would be a good place to mention BREACH as an example of how a DPoP >>> proof (and AT) might leak, despite only being sent over a direct HTTPS >

Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01.txt

2020-11-06 Thread Brian Campbell
On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 2:52 PM Brian Campbell wrote: > > >> 9.1: >> This would be a good place to mention BREACH as an example of how a DPoP >> proof (and AT) might leak, despite only being sent over a direct HTTPS >> channel. Note though that adding a random jti is an effective defence >> agains

Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01.txt

2020-05-05 Thread Brian Campbell
Thanks Neil. I do appreciate your review and feedback (even if it takes me a nontrivial amount of time to reply). I've attempted to respond to things inline below. On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 5:51 AM Neil Madden wrote: > Some review comments: > > Section 1: > I think terms like “relatively simple” a

Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01.txt

2020-05-04 Thread Neil Madden
Some review comments: Section 1: I think terms like “relatively simple” are subjective and should be left out. I don’t think the machinery of JWS signature verification (and associated security issues) is necessarily simple at all. “stronger methods … such as [RFC8705] or [token binding]” I wou