gt;> > following:
>>> >
>>> > - Non-repudiation: high-security deployments may require that requests
>>> be
>>> > authenticated (signed) in a non-repudiateable way[1]
>>> > - Access to protected resources is not protected by SSL,
>> host name. And changing the load balancing architecture once deployed
> >>> could be very hard.
> >>>
> >>> Since there is a state parameter maybe it is enough to allow wild
> >>> cards only in the domain nam
this is worth adding to the spec? It seems to be a
> simple
> >> addition and allows us to standardize what is emerging as a common
> >> capability.
> >>
> >> -- Dick
> >> ___
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> > ___
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
> ___
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
--
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
http://twitter.com/raffi
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ook
> > platform I'd be wondering.
> >
> >
> >
> > From:oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:
> oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf
> > Of Allen Tom
> > Sent: Wednesday, April 21, 2010 3:01 PM
> > To: OAuth WG
> > Subject: [OAUTH-WG] New service provider that supports OAuth 2.0
> >
> >
t; https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
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Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
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> WRAP was to replace HTTP Cookie auth, and it should be up to the service
> provider to require HTTPS when applicable.
>
> Allen
>
>
> ___
> OAuth mailing list
> oa...@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
>
> __
> Authorization Server. (This is probably the default and could be
> >>> unneeded.)
> >>>
> >>> mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full page.
> >>>
> >>> Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it will
ents will never need to use this parameter because it will
> >> automatically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but developers can
> >> override it and it's needed in the Web Client flow.
> >>
> >> --David
> >> ___
> >> O
Lahav wrote:
> Why do you need to change the cryptographic properties of a token during
> refresh?
>
>
>
> EHL
>
>
>
> *From:* Raffi Krikorian [mailto:ra...@twitter.com]
> *Sent:* Friday, March 26, 2010 10:46 AM
> *To:* Torsten Lodderstedt
> *Cc:* Eran Hammer-
t is unable to
> provide an appropriate token type/secret.
>
sure - so at the first request time, you can request. it is still possible
to upgrade and download the token time during refresh (switch from non
signature to signature based on the refresh)?
--
gt;>>
> > >> Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of
> > >> possession tokens rarely look the same.
> > >> ___
> > >> OAuth mailing list
> > >> OAuth@ietf.org
> > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> > >>
> > > ___
> > > OAuth mailing list
> > > OAuth@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> > >
> >
>
> ___
> OAuth mailing list
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
--
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
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