Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC for Browser-based Apps

2023-08-10 Thread Philippe De Ryck
Hi Dick, The solutions you list here focus on using a service worker to intercept an outgoing call to a resource server. During interception, the service worker attaches the access token. This pattern is mainly used to avoid inserting access token logic into the application code. The SW attache

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Trust model

2023-08-10 Thread Michael Jones
I HIGHLY recommend the authoritative blog post on the subject “OAuth 2.0 and Sign-In”, written by a dear friend to many of us, Vittorio Bertocci, just over a decade ago. While Microsoft took it down, it lives on in the Wayback Machine at http://web.archive.org/web/20130105031040/http://blogs.m

Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC for Browser-based Apps

2023-08-10 Thread Dick Hardt
Philippe: would you expand on your comment: On Wed, Aug 9, 2023 at 11:51 PM Philippe De Ryck < phili...@pragmaticwebsecurity.com> wrote: - Remove unproven and overly complicated solutions (i.e., the service worker approach) A quick Google on oauth service workers returned a number of articles a

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Trust model

2023-08-10 Thread Dick Hardt
Sorry -- I have not read this thread in depth, so if you have another crisp example, please send. Your description sounds like an identity problem and not an authorization problem. OAuth solves the latter, and it is a feature that the RS does need to know the client, only that the client is author

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Trust model

2023-08-10 Thread Matthias Fulz
I'm running out of ideas to get the point explained... Ok let's try it from an abstract view: Think about a school where your kid is allowed to get picked up by a legitimated list of persons -> ok Now think about the school saying I'm trusting a third party about identifying any person on th

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Trust model

2023-08-10 Thread Dick Hardt
This sentence does not make sense to me "which AS is AUTHORIZED at which RS acting as the user" The RS server has delegated authorization decisions to the AS The client is acting as the user On Thu, Aug 10, 2023 at 2:59 PM Matthias Fulz wrote: > I can follow your point but please try to think

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Trust model

2023-08-10 Thread Matthias Fulz
I can follow your point but please try to think from a different perspective: As authorization protocol, how can it not let the user decide which AS is AUTHORIZED at which RS acting as the user? On 8/10/23 23:28, Dick Hardt wrote: "auth providers" is an extremely confusing term. OAuth has

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Trust model

2023-08-10 Thread Dick Hardt
"auth providers" is an extremely confusing term. OAuth has no involvement in the content an RS provides the client -- the AS only provides authorization to access the content at the RS. It is common that the AS and RS are the same entity, but the protocol is designed to have a separation of conce

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [External Sender] Re: OAuth Trust model

2023-08-10 Thread Dick Hardt
Per https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html OpenID Connect 1.0 is a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol. It enables Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based on the authentication performed by an Authorization Server, as well as to obtain basic profile i

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [External Sender] Re: OAuth Trust model

2023-08-10 Thread George Fletcher
On Thu, Aug 10, 2023 at 4:30 PM Hans Zandbelt wrote: > On Thu, Aug 10, 2023 at 9:40 PM George Fletcher 40capitalone@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > >> Hi Matthias, >> >> First, OAuth is about authorization and NOT authentication. If you are >> concerned with Authentication then this thread should m

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [External Sender] Re: OAuth Trust model

2023-08-10 Thread Matthias Fulz
I get your points, but still let me ask a stupid question: Even if (and I can follow your arguments why) it is in general out of scope, why couldn't it be included into OAuth to avoid such issues at the core layer that other software is relaying on? I mean: Of course in a perfect world the au

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Trust model

2023-08-10 Thread Matthias Fulz
On 8/10/23 10:25, Warren Parad wrote: You've lost me at this: Some site, which I'm registered in is trusting some oauth provider I'm not even knowing about. I'm not registered at this provider. If this provider is (independent how or from whom) is used in a malicious way, they c

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [External Sender] Re: OAuth Trust model

2023-08-10 Thread Hans Zandbelt
On Thu, Aug 10, 2023 at 9:40 PM George Fletcher wrote: > Hi Matthias, > > First, OAuth is about authorization and NOT authentication. If you are > concerned with Authentication then this thread should move to the OpenID > Connect working group mailing list :) > Allow me to set the public record

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [External Sender] Re: OAuth Trust model

2023-08-10 Thread George Fletcher
Hi Matthias, First, OAuth is about authorization and NOT authentication. If you are concerned with Authentication then this thread should move to the OpenID Connect working group mailing list :) Second, if I'm understanding the problem correctly, the issue is NOT with OAuth (the protocol) or the

Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC for Browser-based Apps

2023-08-10 Thread Aaron Parecki
Hi Philippe, I look forward to discussing this with you at the OAuth Security Workshop later this month. Like I mentioned to you last year, I want to make sure your concerns are adequately captured in the document. The goal for this draft is not to present the one "best" architecture for browser-b

Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC for Browser-based Apps

2023-08-10 Thread Brock Allen
I agree with Philippe here. If there are already documented attack vectors working around the techniques presented in this document, then I worry it will give people a false sense of security if they follow the guidance contained therein.  -Brock On 8/10/2023 2:51:35 AM, Philippe De Ryck wro

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Trust model

2023-08-10 Thread Warren Parad
You've lost me at this: Some site, which I'm registered in is trusting some oauth provider I'm not > even knowing about. I'm not registered at this provider. If this provider > is (independent how or from whom) is used in a malicious way, they can > access my account, without my knowledge by sendi