I'm not sure if these items have been brought up previously or are already
on the agenda to be discussed at the interim meeting.
Referring to the latest draft (
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-04.html) ...
1. The definition given under section 2.1 Client Types is:
> Clients
I do not support adopting this work as proposed, with the caveat that I am a
co-editor of the DPoP work.
We unfortunately do not have a single approach for PoP which works for all
scenarios and deployments, why we have had several proposals and standards such
as Token Binding, mutual TLS, and D
We can definitely start without that general purpose security mechanism
being proven, by using other proven mechanisms to solve the same problem.
There's no reason we need to depend on nor utilize HTTPSig for solving the
problems hoped to be achieved with this draft. But we do need to stipulate
con
inline
On Fri, Oct 8, 2021 at 2:00 PM Richard Backman, Annabelle <
richa...@amazon.com> wrote:
> IE, if the success of HTTP Signing is tied to the OAuth WG adopting the
> draft, then Mike's arguments about the WG already doing this work is valid.
>
>
> It's not the success of HTTP Message Signatu
IE, if the success of HTTP Signing is tied to the OAuth WG adopting the draft,
then Mike's arguments about the WG already doing this work is valid.
It's not the success of HTTP Message Signatures that concerns me here; that
draft will reach RFC regardless of what the OAuth WG does. But I and oth
I think there are a bunch of different conversations happening here at the
same time. Individual responses arguing for/against others in the WG isn't
going to be productive over email. If the goal is to convince everyone that
there are merits despite the objections, then tracking those objections a
We need to come up with a better argument such as: This allows a client to
reduce use of the token to a smaller window to where the signature is also
valid.
We have one: prevent unauthorized parties from using access tokens. Since a
client's signing key never needs to leave the client's system,
I understand the layering that you’re describing, Justin. That said, all the
complexity of OAuth 1 and draft-ietf-oauth-signed-http-request are still there
*and more*. The complexity is just moved to a different draft in the HTTP
working group that the proposed OAuth draft in question has take
On Fri, Oct 8, 2021 at 12:39 PM Richard Backman, Annabelle <
richa...@amazon.com> wrote:
>
> Blocking WG development of an OAuth 2.0 profile of Message Signatures
> behind widespread deployment of Message Signatures risks creating a
> deadlock where the WG is waiting for implementations from would
>
> HTTP Message Signing exists, people are implementing it and using it.
Token Binding existed as well.
HTTP Message Signing is not yet an RFC, and in my opinion it only makes
sense for OAuth to build on top of it if it is successful with lots of
interoperable deployments.
ᐧ
On Fri, Oct 8, 202
"This draft is actually significantly simpler than DPoP precisely because
it is not defining an HTTP signing mechanism. "
that is my understanding as well, but I was afraid to start a flame war :D
On Fri, Oct 8, 2021 at 4:23 PM Justin Richer wrote:
> Hi Mike,
>
> One of the major benefits of thi
I agree that Token Binding is not an experience we want to repeat, and I
understand having a "once bitten, twice shy" reaction to this. However, the
circumstances that led to Token Binding's failure do not apply to Message
Signatures. Token Binding required changes in the user agent, meaning tha
Hi Mike,
One of the major benefits of this proposed draft is that it does not try to
solve the problem of HTTP message signing — which is a huge problem unto
itself. When I wrote the original draft-ietf-oauth-signed-http-request, I
wasn’t able to write it to depend on a general-purpose HTTP sig
Thank you RIfaat.
Looks good to me, too.
Best regards,
Karsten
On 08.10.2021 15:49, Daniel Fett wrote:
Hi Rifaat,
looks good to me!
-Daniel
Am 08.10.21 um 15:13 schrieb Rifaat Shekh-Yusef:
All,
The following is the first version of the shepherd writeup for
the draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-r
I do not support adoption of this draft. OAuth 1 failed because of the
complexity of HTTP Signing and the resulting difficulty of achieving interop.
draft-ietf-oauth-signed-http-request was abandoned by the working group
recognizing that it was resurrecting equivalent complexity to OAuth 1. T
I support adoption of this draft as a working group document.
I have seen a few objections due in part to the draft not addressing this or
that topic. Bear in mind that this is a call for adoption of a draft; this is
not WGLC. It is generally expected that a draft may be far from complete before
Hi Rifaat,
looks good to me!
-Daniel
Am 08.10.21 um 15:13 schrieb Rifaat Shekh-Yusef:
> All,
>
> The following is the first version of the shepherd writeup for
> the draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp document.
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/shepherdwriteup/
>
All,
The following is the first version of the shepherd writeup for
the draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp document.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/shepherdwriteup/
Please, take a look and let me know if I missed anything.
I plan to ship it to the IESG next week.
Reg
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