Not directly related to DPoP or OAuth, but I wrote some notes to help
recovering XSS Nihilists:
https://neilmadden.blog/2020/12/10/xss-doesnt-have-to-be-game-over/
— Neil
> On 12 Dec 2020, at 00:02, Brian Campbell
> wrote:
>
>
> I think that puts Jim in the XSS Nihilism camp :)
>
> Impli
I think that puts Jim in the XSS Nihilism camp :)
Implicit type flows are being deprecated/discouraged. But keeping tokens
out of browsers doesn't seem likely. There is some menton of CSP in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-07#section-9.7
On Wed, Dec 9, 2020 at 4:10
Any type of client could use DPoP and (presumably) benefit from
sender-constrained access tokens. So yeah, adding complexity specifically
for browser-based applications (that only mitigates one variation of the
attacks possible with XSS anyway) has 'cost' impact to those clients as
well. And shoul
The scenario you describe here is realistic in browser-based apps with XSS
vulnerabilities, but it is pretty complex. Since there are worse problems when
XSS happens, it’s hard to say whether DPoP should mitigate this.
I’m wondering what other types of clients would benefit from using DPoP for
