+1 to all what Aaron said. Thanks for pointing this out!
We need to address this in the security BCP and this will be a normative
change that affects OpenID Connect Core (just as our current
recommendation on the usage of nonce).
We would then have:
- use PKCE, except if you use OIDC with a nonc
From working with a lot of developers on understanding OAuth 2.0 and OIDC, I
definitely vote for simplicity. Understanding the subtle nuances of when a
nonce is fine and when PKCE should be used is impossible without in-depth
knowledge of the flows and their properties. Misunderstandings will ca
Thanks Vittorio for your thoughts!
On Thu, May 7, 2020 at 1:29 PM Vittorio Bertocci wrote:
> Hi Prabath,
>
> Thanks for your comment! Here are my thoughts.
>
> I don’t believe embedding the state in the AT would help. The state is
> generated (hence verified, if used for protection) by the clie
Aaron, I believe you’re trying to optimize the wrong thing. You’re concerned
about “the amount of explanation this will take”. That’s optimizing for spec
simplicity – a goal that I do understand. However, by writing these few
sentences or paragraphs, we’ll make it clear to developers that hun
Backing up a step or two, there's another point here that I think has been
missed in these discussions.
PKCE solves two problems: stolen authorization codes for public clients,
and authorization code injection for all clients. We've only been talking
about authorization code injection on the list
Hi Prabath,
Thanks for your comment! Here are my thoughts.
I don’t believe embedding the state in the AT would help. The state is
generated (hence verified, if used for protection) by the client, but the
content of the AT is really meant for the RS, which has no direct knowledge of
what the stat
Hi all,
Can we say in [1], that the AS should add the value of *state* parameter
from the authorization request (if present), to the JWT access token it
generates?
This will help to address token injection issue [2], with respect to the
implicit grant type.
Appreciate your thoughts on this.
[1]
Hi Denis,
Am 07.05.20 um 14:46 schrieb Denis:
> (...)
>
> A new definition for the term client should be adopted for this
> document. However, you are right, the two wordings shall remain.
>
I cannot follow any of this, sorry.
>>>
>>> 3) The "_Updated _OAuth 2.0 Attacker Model" is supposed to ha
Perhaps quite late, but a few comments/questions related to this:
1) When decoded, all the JWT samples are missing the "typ" claim from the
header, which I think should be "oauth.authz.req+jwt".
2) When validating the JAR if we are to validate the "typ" then this would be
incompatible with OIDC
Hi Daniel,
Hi Denis,
Am 05.05.20 um 17:19 schrieb Denis:
Comments on draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-15
1) Historically, the acronym RO (Resource Owner) has been used but is
still used in this document.
Since a client is not necessarily any more a RO, it would be more
adequate to use t
Hi Denis,
Am 05.05.20 um 17:19 schrieb Denis:
> Comments on draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-15
>
> 1) Historically, the acronym RO (Resource Owner) has been used but is
> still used in this document.
> Since a client is not necessarily any more a RO, it would be more
> adequate to use the wor
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