This looks like a very reasonable and fairly achievable security defense
feature.
So would you suggest that the core JWE standard provide clear guidance
to library authors about when to use compression? Would you also suggest
that we need additional flags on JWT elements that do or do not need to
Hi Jim,
The problem is not the encryption of attacker-controlled data. The
problem is the interaction between this encryption and compression.
If you don't need compression, you're good. You're mostly OK if you can
compress only the non-attacker controlled data, however this could
potentiall
Yaron,
As a developer, I can think of many scenarios where the attacker controls some
of the plaintext yet I still need encryption services of some kind. What are
the proper crypto controls that allow developers to do this safely? I think
that's the better question right now.
Aloha,
--
Jim Man
So, you're saying the STS has to define a subject_type for each external
token the client wants to exchange from? A type that is potentially
proprietary and different between each and every STS? On the opposite
end, when you want to convert to an external token, the STS either has 3
options fo