Re: [OAUTH-WG] defining new response types

2011-07-11 Thread Eran Hammer-Lahav
As for the plus encoding we can choose another char or give an example. On Jul 11, 2011, at 18:07, "Marius Scurtescu" wrote: > If I read section 8.4 correctly it seems that new response types can > be defined but composite values must be registered explicitly. > > I don't think this approach s

Re: [OAUTH-WG] defining new response types

2011-07-11 Thread Eran Hammer-Lahav
You are over complicating it. You can define anything you want. But if you want to use the special + character, each of the parts must be defined and registered. If parts of a combination don't make sense on their own use something else to join them like underscore. EHL On Jul 11, 2011, at 18

[OAUTH-WG] defining new response types

2011-07-11 Thread Marius Scurtescu
If I read section 8.4 correctly it seems that new response types can be defined but composite values must be registered explicitly. I don't think this approach scales too well. OpenID Connect for example is adding a new response type: id_token. id_token can be combined with either code or token a

Re: [OAUTH-WG] best practices for storing access token for implicit clients

2011-07-11 Thread Doug Tangren
My guess about no cookies was in the design of implicit client token passing, the access token is never shared with the server, only the browser via the redirect_uri's fragment. Once the browser has the token, my question was about how (or even if) people are storing access tokens between page refr

Re: [OAUTH-WG] best practices for storing access token for implicit clients

2011-07-11 Thread Ian McKellar
Can't LocalStorage etc be stolen with XSS too? If an attacker gets their JS running on the page then the game is up. Ian On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 7:06 PM, Larry Suto wrote: > Cookies can be stolen by directed XSS attacks. > > Larry > > On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 3:46 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav > wrote:

Re: [OAUTH-WG] best practices for storing access token for implicit clients

2011-07-11 Thread Larry Suto
Cookies can be stolen by directed XSS attacks. Larry On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 3:46 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote: > Any cookie? What about a Secure cookie limited to a specific sub-domain? > What are the concerns about cookies? I think this would be helpful to > discuss. > > EHL > > > -Original

Re: [OAUTH-WG] best practices for storing access token for implicit clients

2011-07-11 Thread Ian McKellar
The issue with a cookie is that it might go over the wire in plain-text. If a cookie is set to be Secure (and hence only used over HTTPS) then it should be fine. Ian On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 6:46 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote: > Any cookie? What about a Secure cookie limited to a specific sub-domai

Re: [OAUTH-WG] best practices for storing access token for implicit clients

2011-07-11 Thread Eran Hammer-Lahav
Any cookie? What about a Secure cookie limited to a specific sub-domain? What are the concerns about cookies? I think this would be helpful to discuss. EHL > -Original Message- > From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf > Of Marius Scurtescu > Sent: Monday,

Re: [OAUTH-WG] best practices for storing access token for implicit clients

2011-07-11 Thread Marius Scurtescu
On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 12:45 PM, Doug Tangren wrote: > What is the current recommended practice of storing an implicit client's > access_tokens? LocalStorage, im mem and re-request auth on every browser > refresh? Both sound reasonable. I think most important is how NOT to store it, in a cookie.

[OAUTH-WG] Fwd: [members] 15-day Public Review for SAML 2.0 Session Token Profile Version 1.0

2011-07-11 Thread Phil Hunt
For your info. Some of this material may be of interest -- particularly for those looking at developing token specifications that carry session information. While this specification is meant for browser sessions, some of the info may be relevant to tracking state with http clients via authori