Hi-- We had a bit of a glitch in the half-hour before the webinar, and sent out
fresh notification emails. It sounds like you didn't get yours, for which I'm
very sorry! We had about 20 people on. There will be a recording
(audio/video) available soon -- I'll alert this list at that time -- a
This proposal is to allow use of same token to access multiple
protected resource across different servers. At minimum making it
optional would help in wide variety of media delivery use cases.
Proposal details:
Exclude hostname and port number in normalized request string
creation. Another possib
I registered for the seminar, got the bridge info, dialed in and nobody
was there.
Are there slides available?
>-Original Message-
>From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org]
>On Behalf Of ext Eve Maler
>Sent: 25 January, 2010 14:03
>To: OAuth WG
>Subject: [OAUTH-WG] F
I'm fine with letting the market decide whether to use SSL or implement their
own crypto in libraries (I know our implementations will choose SSL-only), but
that means we'll be going from fully compliant with OAuth WRAP to partially
compliant with OAuth 2.0 by making the same choices. Some conce
> -Original Message-
> From: Luke Shepard [mailto:lshep...@facebook.com]
> Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2010 11:55 PM
> > We have no business telling servers what they MUST implement (they
> > might consider S-Plain too weak for their needs)
>
> Of all the negatives I listed below about S
Of course. :)
On Fri, Jan 29, 2010 at 12:13 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:
> Hopefully by 1.0 you mean draft-hammer-oauth, not the community edition
> with its “Consumer Key” and other inventions.
>
>
>
> EHL
>
>
>
> *From:* oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Da
Hopefully by 1.0 you mean draft-hammer-oauth, not the community edition with
its "Consumer Key" and other inventions.
EHL
From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of David
Recordon
Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2010 10:35 PM
To: Peter Saint-Andre; Luke Shepard
Cc: OA
For one, we know never to assume that SSL is implemented correctly (not in
terms of the libraries but how certificate exceptions are handled and how its
defenses can be compromised). S-Plain also exposes the secret to intermediaries
while signatures can pass through without being compromised. I
