RE: [RFCv2 4/4] bpf: inhibit speculated out-of-bounds pointers

> On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 02:57:50PM +, Mark Rutland wrote: > > Note: this patch is an *example* use of the nospec API. It is understood > > that this is incomplete, etc. > > > > Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus, > > memory accesses under a bounds check ma

Re: [RFCv2 4/4] bpf: inhibit speculated out-of-bounds pointers

On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 02:57:50PM +, Mark Rutland wrote: > Note: this patch is an *example* use of the nospec API. It is understood > that this is incomplete, etc. > > Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus, > memory accesses under a bounds check may be specul