Hey Ted,
On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 8:12 PM, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> I think this opens up a big window for optimizing it even
> further.
I optimized it a bit further and siphash is now the clear winner over chacha:
[1.784801] random benchmark!!
[1.785161] get_random_long # cycles: 415
Hi again,
On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 5:37 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> [3.606139] random benchmark!!
> [3.606276] get_random_int # cycles: 326578
> [3.606317] get_random_int_new # cycles: 95438
> [3.607423] get_random_bytes # cycles: 2653388
Looks to me like my siphash implementation
Hey Ted,
On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 5:37 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> One somewhat undesirable aspect of the current algorithm is that we
> never change random_int_secret.
Why exactly would this be a problem? So long as the secret is kept
secret, the PRF is secure. If an attacker can read arbitrary k
On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 04:10:37AM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> This duplicates the current algorithm for get_random_int/long, but uses
> siphash24 instead. This comes with several benefits. It's certainly
> faster and more cryptographically secure than MD5. This patch also
> hashes the pid,
This duplicates the current algorithm for get_random_int/long, but uses
siphash24 instead. This comes with several benefits. It's certainly
faster and more cryptographically secure than MD5. This patch also
hashes the pid, entropy, and timestamp as fixed width fields, in order
to increase diffusion
