On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 09:23:06PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:55 PM, Linus Torvalds
> wrote:
> > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Dan Williams
> > wrote:
> >> +#ifndef nospec_ptr
> >> +#define nospec_ptr(ptr, lo, hi)
> >>
On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:55 PM, Linus Torvalds
wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>> +#ifndef nospec_ptr
>> +#define nospec_ptr(ptr, lo, hi)
>>\
>
> Do we actually want this horrible interface?
>
> It just causes the compi
On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> +#ifndef nospec_ptr
> +#define nospec_ptr(ptr, lo, hi)
> \
Do we actually want this horrible interface?
It just causes the compiler - or inline asm - to generate worse code,
because it needs to
From: Mark Rutland
Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.
This patch adds helpers which can be used to inhibit the use of
ou
