Re: [RFC] SECMARK 1.1

2006-05-15 Thread Karl MacMillan
o > address concerns raised by Karl MacMillan on providing fine-grained > assurances for network applications which pass connections (e.g. xinetd). > > If all looks ok, I'll rebase the entire patchset (also merging elements > from the patch below back into other patches), a

Re: [RFC] SECMARK 1.0

2006-05-09 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Tue, 2006-05-09 at 12:40 -0400, James Morris wrote: > On Tue, 9 May 2006, Karl MacMillan wrote: > > > those connection, but my concern is that connection could, through error > > or exploit, be passed to another domain that should not receive packets > > from that type

Re: [RFC] SECMARK 1.0

2006-05-09 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Mon, 2006-05-08 at 17:29 -0400, James Morris wrote: > On Mon, 8 May 2006, Karl MacMillan wrote: > > > Something like CONNMARK seems preferable to me (perhaps even allowing > > type_transition rules to give the related packets a unique type). This > > makes the l

Re: [RFC][SECMARK 08/08] Add selinux_relabel_packet_permission() check to xt_SECMARK

2006-05-08 Thread Karl MacMillan
Glad that you added this. This only checks on the addition of rules, correct? Obviously changes that don't include an addition (e.g., removal) could change the labeling behavior. Is it possible / needed to try to provide anything like the relabelto/relabelfrom pairing that is present for f

Re: [RFC] SECMARK 1.0

2006-05-08 Thread Karl MacMillan
erious downsides to this approach? > You can always not use conntrack and emulate the existing controls, as > well. > Yes, but gaining connection tracking is a major advantage of this approach over the existing controls. Karl -- Karl MacMillan Tresys Technology www.tresys.com > &